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Nizan Geslevich Packin

 
Despite considerable recent legislative attention to risk management 
such as the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, excessive risk-taking by 
financial institutions is still rampant.  Decision-makers do not make risky 
decisions in a vacuum, but in an environment where multiple factors can 
influence their decisions.  Such factors include cognitive-related biases and 
group-related biases.  There are also tools, which have not yet been 
analyzed in the literature, that regulators can use to reduce undesirable or 
excessive risk-taking.  Indeed, by shaping such environmental factors in 
which risk-related decisions in financial institutions are made, regulation 
can help actors make better, less risky choices.  With the goal of helping 
reduce excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, this Article builds on 
an emerging focus in behavioral law and economics on prospects for 
“debiasing” actors through the structure of legal rules and policy.  
Accordingly, the Article suggests using behavioral economics-based legal 
guidelines to supplement the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk management 
provisions, specifically the requirement that financial institutions create 
separate risk committees.  Behavioral economics-based legal guidelines 
would help reduce the degree of biased behavior that risk committees 
exhibit. 
The legal guidelines proposed in this Article focus on the composition, 
obligations, and work procedures of the financial institutions’ newly 
mandated risk committees.  These guidelines provide behavioral incentives 
that will not only help reduce excessive risk-taking, but may even raise 
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social responsibility awareness, all while not compromising financial 
institutions’ legal and financial responsibilities.  The Article uses 
JPMorgan’s 2012 multi-billion dollar trading loss and MF Global’s 2011 
collapse as case studies on certain behavioral effects and biases that are 
prevalent in the context of risk-taking.  Within the context of these two 
events the Article analyzes the impact that diversity has on group 
dynamics, the influence that prior experiences and internal honesty 
standards can have on decision makers, the choice shift phenomenon, the 
illusion of control, the framing effect, the impact of accountability, the 
impact that the association of risk with potential disastrous outcomes has 
on decision makers, the familiarity bias, and the hindsight bias.  The 
proposed guidelines, which address these biases, could have helped 
mitigate or possibly avoid the damages from the great JPMorgan trading 
losses and the MF Global collapse. 
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“How risk is judged depends upon the context in which the judgments 
take place.”
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, regulators have focused on avoiding 
similar future crises by using tools such as enhanced macro-prudential 
regulation and stress testing.  While these tools may help to reduce some of 
the most egregious conduct that led to the crisis, little has changed in 
financial institutions’ business cultures as it relates to decisions on risk.  
Moreover, while there is no shortage of literature on the need to limit or 
better monitor risk-taking, there has been little discussion or agreement on 
what kind of risk-taking is actually excessive, or even how to define 
excessive risk.
2
  Accordingly, attempts to directly mandate that risk-related 
decision-makers not take excessive risks have proven ineffective, as have 
attempts to set risk thresholds for financial institutions.
3
  In addition, 
several years after the onset of the financial crisis, many of the ill-designed 
incentives that initially fueled the financial crisis remain largely 
undisturbed today.  This was demonstrated by JPMorgan’s 2012 massive 
trading loss due to risky behavior,
4
 and the 2011 collapse of publicly traded 
 
 1.  Berndt Brehmer, The Psychology of Risk, in RISK AND DECISION 25, 36 (W.T. 
Singleton & Jan Howden eds., 1987). 
 2.  See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving 
Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United 
States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1438, 1440, 1449-50 (2010) (“[T]he concept[] of . . . 
‘excessive risk’ [is] controversial. Whether . . . there is any such thing as excessive risk, and 
if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is another issue. . . . The credit crisis of 2008-2009 
also convinced many observers that the level of risk in the financial sector was excessive. 
. . . The more hotly debated question, however, is . . . [w]hich particular decisions by 
bankers were excessively risky, which were not, and how can one distinguish between the 
two? . . . Discerning excessive risk from other risk is highly subjective and an analysis likely 
to be undertaken differently in different cultural contexts. . . .  The predominant unit of 
analysis for defining excessive risk—the individual risk bearer or society as a whole—can 
be different in different cultural contexts.”) (citations omitted). 
 3.  At least one court has held that:  
[a]t one time . . . prudent investor rule[s] broadly prohibited expansive 
categories of investments and techniques classified as ‘speculative.’ . . .  Since 
then, ‘[k]nowledge, practices, and experience in the modern investment world 
have demonstrated that arbitrary restrictions on trust investments are 
unwarranted and often counterproductive.’ . . .  Speculation is no longer 
imprudent per se. 
Heidecker Farms, Inc. v. Heidecker, No. 09-1541, 10-0273, 2010 WL 3894199, at *6 (Iowa 
Ct.App. Oct.6, 2010) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 4.  At the time this Article was written, the dimensions of the losses due to the risky 
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futures broker MF Global, which took excessive risks while maintaining an 
illusion of control.
5
 
Despite regulators’ efforts directed at reducing risk-related decision-
makers’ potential excessive risk-taking, and ample attention given to 
regulatory overhaul and corporate financial incentives—most notably 
through the Dodd-Frank Act
6
—not all measures were exhausted.  Indeed, 
we still have not addressed the undesired effects of social influences and 
psychological biases on the behavior of, and choices made by, the risk-
related decision-makers at financial institutions. This is unfortunate 
because, as I shall demonstrate in this Article, taking excessive risks can be 
traceable, at least to some extent, to such influences and biases,
7
 and 
behavioral economic tools can enhance the substantive economic and 
financial tools that are already being used.
8
  Behavioral economic tools can 
 
behavior demonstrated by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (hereafter “JPMorgan”) were still not 
clear. As a result, the biggest bank in the United States faced investigations by the Justice 
Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission that subpoenaed internal documents related to the bank’s loss.  See, e.g., Polya 
Lesova, J.P. Morgan loss may reportedly hit $9 billion, MARKET WATCH, (June 28, 2012, 
4:13 PM), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/london-whale-loss-reportedly-
may-hit-9-billion-2012-06-28 (discussing the potential losses from JPMorgan’s risky 
investment in complex credit derivatives); Jia Lynn Yang, Rough times for JPMorgan, 
GARP (July 7, 2012), available at http://www.garp.org/risk-news-and-resources/risk-headlin 
es/story.aspx?newsid=49375 (noting that JPMorgan’s stock price had gone down following 
regulatory inquiries). 
 5.  MF Global Holdings Ltd. (hereafter “MF Global”) handled trades that allowed 
hedging and speculation in commodities such as pork bellies, metals, and foreign currencies 
as its primary business through its operations in a dozen countries.  It ended up collapsing in 
late 2011.  See generally Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Last Days of MF Global, 
FORTUNE (June 4, 2012, 3:17 PM), available at http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/201 
2/06/04/the-last-days-of-mf-global/ (noting that the company’s collapse “shattered public 
trust in the belief that brokerage customers’ money is always safe”). 
 6.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 922, § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891-96 (2010) [“Dodd-Frank Act”] (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11). 
 7.  In addition, despite the shortage of literature on this point, at least a few 
commentators paid some attention to social influences and psychological biases.  See Mary 
Driscoll, Pay People to Avoid Risky Behavior, HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK, (May 29, 
2012, 9:40 AM) http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/05/pay_people_to_avoid_risky_beha.html 
(questioning how CEOs can influence far-flung staff to do the right thing consistently, and 
how to influence behavior). 
 8.  See generally Robert J. Shiller, Behavioral Economics and Institutional Innovation, 
72 S. ECON. J. 2, 269 (2005) (arguing that behavioral economics brought economic ideas to 
successful results).  The normative implications of behavioral decision research are 
considered to be in the realm of means, not ends.  While this Article does not suggest 
differently, it is based on the concept that “behavioral economics should complement . . . 
more substantive economic interventions.  If traditional economics suggests that we should 
have a larger price difference between sugar-free and sugared drinks, behavioral economics 
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help create better incentives, but also “debias” individuals through the 
structure of legal rules, and help change financial institutions’ risk 
management culture.
9
  Under this debiasing approach, carefully designed 
legal guidelines can operate directly on actors’ social and cognitive biases, 
as well as judgment errors, and attempt to help such actors either to reduce 
or to eliminate those biases and errors.
10
  Since risk-related decision makers 
make their choices in an environment where multiple noticed and 
unnoticed factors can affect their choices, legally shaping the environment 
in which those decisions are made can help decision makers make less 
biased choices.
11
 
This is not to say that the Dodd-Frank Act fails to regulate dangerous 
or excessive risk-taking.  While the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002
12
 compelled corporate boards to focus on compliance, the recent 
financial crisis shifted corporate focus to strategic risk-taking.
13
  As a 
result, the Dodd-Frank Act appropriately focuses on regulating risks. The 
Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
14
 which is charged 
 
could suggest whether consumers would respond better to a subsidy on unsweetened drinks 
or a tax on sugary drinks.”  George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A31. 
 9.  See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD., 199 (2006); see also Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Law and 
Preferences, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 331 (2004) (explaining that the legal system does more 
than provide incentives; it also affects the preference profile in the population and who 
individuals are).  Similarly, it has been argued that:  “The suggestion is often made that, if 
the law symbolically denounces some preferences or reinforces others by appearing to 
embody certain viewpoints, individuals will come to adopt different preferences and, in 
turn, to behave differently.”  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE (2002) (arguing that the influence of legal policy on norms and preferences is 
founded on the symbolic or expressive impact of law.  If the law says that X is negative, 
then preferences will ultimately adjust to disvalue X; and conversely, if the law says that X 
is positive, then preferences will adjust to value X). 
 10.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 9.  
 11.  Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture (Apr. 2, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583509. 
 12.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 29, 
2002 (enhancing financial reporting standards in reaction to several major corporate 
scandals, which cost investors billions of dollars when the share prices collapsed, including 
those relating to Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom). 
 13.  It has been argued that historically, American business regulation has been passed 
in response to major breakdowns in corporate America.  See generally DAVID A. SKEEL JR., 
ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND 
WHERE THEY CAME FROM 8-14 (2005) (arguing that such major breakdowns are typically 
related to excessive risk-taking). 
 14.  The Financial Stability Oversight Council includes representatives from the 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, the CFTC and the federal banking 
regulators. 
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with identifying risks to global financial stability.
15
  The Dodd-Frank Act 
also includes a “living wills” requirement that attempts to prevent potential 
systemic risks caused by the collapse of a significant financial institution.
16
  
This requirement mandates that systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) develop strategic analyses of their businesses, and 
submit reorganization or resolution plans for their operations to 
regulators.
17
 
While the last few years demonstrated the need for such stricter 
regulation, enhancing regulation concerning risk-taking can stifle progress 
and innovation along with the fraud and failure it is intended to reduce.
18
  
Nevertheless, one of the lessons from the 2008 financial crisis is that risk-
taking by large financial institutions imposes externalities on society.
19
  In 
light of those externalities, legal intervention to regulate the risk of such 
externalities is perfectly justified based on standard economic theory.
20
  In 
 
 15.  Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111-112, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322. 
 16.  See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against The Dodd-Frank Act’s 
Living Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 
(forthcoming Spring 2012). 
 17.  On September 13, 2011, the FDIC Board of Directors approved a final rule to be 
issued jointly by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board to implement section 165(d) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, laying out what the largest and most complex financial firms must 
include in living wills.  A draft of the FDIC’s final rule is available online at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/Sept13no4.pdf.  On October 17, 2011 the Federal Reserve 
announced that it had approved the final rule, which became effective November 30, 2011. 
The Federal Reserve’s approval is available online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/press/bcreg/20111017a.htm.   
 18.  See SKEEL, supra note 13, at 196. 
 19.  See e.g., Andrea M. Buffa, Strategic Risk Taking with Systemic Externalities (Aug. 
30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=2022376; Jean-Pierre Danthine, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss 
Nat’l Bank, Speech at the Founding Event of the School of Finance, University of St Gallen: 
After The Crisis - Improving Incentives In The Financial Sector (May 20, 2011); Viral V. 
Acharya et al., Market Failures And Regulatory Failures: Lessons From Past And Present 
Financial Crises (Dec. 5, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stern.n 
yu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/market_failures.pdf (discussing how firms need to 
be forced to internalize the costs of the negative externalities their actions impose on the 
system as a whole). 
 20.  See Marc Labonte, Cong. Reserch Serv., RL32162, The Size and Role of 
Government: Economic Issues, June 14, 2010, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc 
/RL32162.pdf (“Government intervention can increase economic efficiency when market 
failures or externalities exist.”); Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available at http://econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsan 
dExternalities.html (“Most economic arguments for government intervention are based on 
the idea that the marketplace cannot handle externalities. . . . Externalities occur when one 
person’s actions affect another person’s well-being and the relevant costs and benefits are 
not reflected in market prices. . . . A negative externality arises when one person’s actions 
harm another.”). 
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addition, enhancing the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulation of risk management 
at financial institutions is also appropriate given the prevailing culture 
within banks to continue incentivizing excessive risk-taking.
21
  
Accordingly, trying to further minimize the effects of the mentioned 
externalities and the culture at banks, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires that 
all major financial institutions that are supervised by the Federal Reserve 
and that have over ten billion dollars in assets establish separate board risk 
committees.
22
 
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that each risk committee:  (i) oversee 
its financial institution’s risk management practices; (ii) include a number 
of independent directors determined by the Federal Reserve; and (iii) 
employ at least one risk management expert, who has experience in 
managing risk at large, complex financial institutions.
23
  The Dodd-Frank 
Act also states that the Federal Reserve will adopt rules for those risk 
committees.
24
 
Regulators need to adopt special behavioral-economic based legal 
guidelines, as further described, that will counterbalance the negative 
biases of risk committee members.  Traditional economic tools are not 
enough to fight the deeply rooted and undesirable cultural-institutional 
 
 21.  See Hugo Duncan, Toxic Culture Risks a New Crisis, Says Bank, DAILY MAIL (last 
updated Mar. 26, 2012, 1:55 PM), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/news 
/article-2120224/Toxic-culture-risks-new-financial-crisis-warns-Bank-England.html#axzz2J 
ziHP6Ot (noting the need for bank cultures to change to prevent another financial crisis).  In 
addition, Professor Skeel has argued that the business culture in America is one that has 
always loved risk-takers, and that the fundamental flaw in corporate America is the 
encouragement and facilitation of excessive risk.  Accordingly, Professor Skeel argued that 
having self-confidence as well as a visionary insight, and being extremely competitive—all 
desired business traits—can make executives and directors take misguided chances and 
excessive risks.  SKEEL, supra note 13, at 5-7.  In his book, Professor Skeel focuses mainly 
on several characters whose behavior resulted in major breakdowns.  Professor Skeel warns 
about adopting a business culture where directors and executives overly resemble Icarus, 
who “thought less and less about risk, and more and more about the majesty of his powers.”  
SKEEL, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
 22.  Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a board risk committee must be established that 
will be separate from existing committees, such as the audit committee.  The rationale for 
this requirement is that, in addition to having a retrospective aspect, risk management also 
has a forthcoming aspect.  See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management 
in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 131 (2011) 
(noting that, while an audit committee plays an indispensable role in risk management, its 
main focal point is retrospective; but in determining business tactics, the board must also 
take under consideration risk issues with fundamental forthcoming aspects, such as risk 
tolerance and appetite, direction of risk exposure, methods of risk evaluation, emerging 
risks, and the risk exposure of unconventional planning scenarios). 
 23.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5364). 
 24.  Rules on risk committees were to be adopted by July 21, 2012, but have not yet 
taken effect. 
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attitudes and behavioral effects toward excessive risk-taking.  Indeed, while 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s comprehensive financial regulatory reform, 
including its requirement to establish separate risk committees, is an 
important step in the right direction, it is not enough.  For example, in 
2012, JPMorgan lost billions of dollars as a result of excessive risk-
taking,
25
 even as regulators were debating how to best implement the Dodd-
Frank Act’s proposed Volcker rule that is aimed at preventing banks from 
speculating in financial derivatives.  JPMorgan’s traders circumvented the 
rule by labeling the risky bets as “hedges,”
26
 and its loss took place despite 
the scrutiny of 110 regulators from several federal agencies domiciled 
inside JPMorgan.
27
  Indeed, notwithstanding the attempts to closely 
monitor the bank, not a single regulator was inside the London Whale’s ill-
fated trading unit, which managed nearly $400 billion dollars and was 
responsible for the loss.
28
  Bank executives responsible for risk 
management proved to be ineffective at their jobs. 
Incorporating behavioral economic-based guidelines into the 
regulatory framework of financial institutions’ risk management addresses, 
at least, the following deficiencies in the Dodd-Frank Act:  (i) the Act 
ignores social influences and psychological biases in risk-taking and risk 
management; (ii) the Act’s solutions, for the most part, do not 
counterbalance the existence of undesired financial incentives; (iii) the Act 
fails to raise awareness of concerns related to “corporate social 
responsibility”; and (iv) the Act provides insufficient clarity regarding the 
 
 25.  This big loss has renewed the push from Democrats for tough implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  Accordingly, Chairman Tim Johnson said that if a bank with a “solid 
reputation” like JPMorgan could suffer such staggering losses, it proves that “no financial 
institution is immune from bad judgment.” Peter Schroeder, Regulators Take Heat for 
JPMorgan Loss, THE HILL’S FIN. & ECON. BLOG (June 6, 2012, 11:33 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/231225-banking-
regulators-face-fire-on-jpmorgan-losses. 
 26.  See David Cay Johnston, JP Morgan’s $2 billion experiment with truthiness, 
REUTERS BLOG, (June 11, 2012) (“JPMorgan is now defining as a hedge ‘something that 
performs in exactly the opposite fashion of a hedge.’  A hedge is supposed to reduce risk, 
but according to [a senior regulator at the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation], 
the losses came from deals that “dramatically increased risk by placing a second bet in the 
same direction, which compounded the risk.”). 
 27.  See Peter Morici, JPMorgan Debacle Points to Regulatory Incompetence, 
Corruption, CNBC GUEST BLOG (May 29, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47598 
741 (noting that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury’s Comptroller of the Currency were 
among agencies involved in the debacle). 
 28.  Pursuant to reports, senior JPMorgan executives were able to convince federal 
officials that JPMorgan’s Chief Investment Office (CIO), was merely hedging, managing 
cash and taking no significant risks.  Id.  As mentioned, the Dodd-Frank Act was supposed 
to fix the problem of excessive risk taking partly by hiring more regulators, but that clearly 
did not help in JPMorgan’s case.  Id. 
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duties and responsibilities of those responsible for risk management. 
First, the Dodd-Frank Act’s measures ignore behavioral effects on 
risk-taking and risk management.  To fill that vacuum, there are various 
methods and tools that can be used to counterbalance behavioral effects 
including risk managers’ cognitive-related biases and group-related biases 
that are difficult to externally regulate
29
 and are often associated with 
agency problems or shareholder biases.
30
 
Second, many of the measures adopted by the Dodd-Frank Act, 
including the living will requirement, are not preventative solutions.  They 
help deal with complex and problematic situations that SIFIs might be 
forced to deal with, but focus less on preventing such situations from 
forming.
31
  Indeed, most Dodd-Frank Act measures do not counterbalance 
the existence of undesirable financial incentive effects or behavioral 
effects, which include both cognitive-related biases and group-related 
biases.  By the time the regulators learn about relevant existing risks, it 
might be too late to attend to those risks.
32
  Moreover, it can be argued that 
 
 29.  See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term 
Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010) (exploring ways to tie executive 
compensation to long-term performance as opposed to short-term gain).  Similarly, Senator 
Bob Corker has stated that “[t]he notion of having a regulator besides every banker is . . . a 
fool’s errand. . . . Dodd-Frank was a political response instead of real reform in so many 
ways.”  See Schroeder, supra note 25. 
 30.  For example, as a corporate enterprise’s financial situation deteriorates and 
insolvency nears, the corporation’s shareholders will favor adopting riskier strategies 
because they bear minimum downside and unlimited upside potential.  Pamela L.J. Huff & 
Russell C. Silberglied, From Production Resources to Peoples Department Stores: A 
Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian Courts on the Fiduciary Duties of Directors 
to Creditors of Insolvent Companies, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 455, 465 (2007).  This is referred 
to as the “at risk” doctrine, and as a result, the risk of shareholder opportunism falls on the 
creditors, who must rely on the remaining corporate assets to fulfill their contractual claims. 
But this shareholder tendency represents only the shareholders’ interests and is not ideal for 
all of the relevant parties involved, nor does it represent all of the parties’ interests. 
 31.  See Packin, supra note 16, at 150 (“A living wills requirement cannot solve this 
too-big-to-fail problem, because it is essentially a disclosure requirement and not a 
substantial regulation that alters negative market incentives or undesired economic 
incentives.”); see also Ron J. Feldman, Forcing Financial Institution Change Through 
Credible Recovery/Resolution Plans: An Alternative to Plan-Now/Implement-Later Living 
Wills, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.minneapolisfe 
d.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4434 (“[L]iving wills are not credible and 
will not prevent spillovers.  First, absent countervailing forces, SIFIs have organized 
themselves and operate in ways that produce spillovers and bailouts. Neither firm nor 
government can fix those problems at the last minute.  Second, under the living will 
analogy, the firm draws up the living will.  SIFIs have no incentive to draw up credible 
plans.  Finally, creditors will not view living wills drawn up in private as real threats to 
future bailouts.  Thus, creditor discipline will remain too weak.”) (citation omitted). 
 32.  Packin, supra note 16. 
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even with the Dodd-Frank Act in place, regulators are still unable to assess 
activities that seem overly risky.  For example, living wills might not 
disclose to regulators all the relevant information about excessive risks that 
financial institutions are taking because of corporate governance failures, 
such as compensation schemes that encourage risk-taking.  Despite the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to prevent future bail-outs, many still believe that 
SIFIs are too big to fail and will not be left to collapse.
33
  This gives even 
more incentive for decision makers at SIFIs to take on great risks
34
:  If the 
risks pay off, they reap the rewards; if they do not, then they will be bailed 
out.
35
  In the meantime, SIFIs face lower costs of raising capital as they rely 
on bailouts as a worst-case scenario.
36
  Different from the majority of rules 
in the Dodd-Frank Act that, while focusing on avoiding failures, are after-
the-fact in nature, the approach presented in this Article assists in tackling 
some of the negative biases that encourage undesired or excessive risk-
taking before such acts occur. 
Third, while the Dodd-Frank Act’s legitimacy mainly derives from the 
externalities that large financial institutions impose on society, it fails to 
address some of the concerns that the corporate social responsibility
37
 
movement it is focused on.  Following the 2008 financial crisis, a call for 
integrating social facets into mainstream economic models has gained 
unprecedented momentum.
38
  This is not surprising.  Debates over whether 
corporate social responsibility norms should be adopted stretch from the 
 
 33.  See STANDARD & POOR’S, BANKS: CREDIT METHODOLOGY 16 (2011), available at 
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/CriteriaFinancialInstitutionsRequestforComme
ntBanksRatingMethodology.pdf (describing the United States government’s likelihood of 
support for a SIFI as “moderately high”). 
 34.  See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS 
OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004) (analyzing the policy issues surrounding the classification of 
banks as “too big to fail”). 
 35.  See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE 
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010) (chronicling the forces behind the Great 
Recession). 
 36.  See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and 
After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011) (stating that bailout moral 
hazard explains lower capital costs). 
 37.  The corporate social responsibility movement started around 1970.  The 
movement’s thesis was that in order to solve the ills of society, which were believed to be at 
least partially the result of corporate behavior, some type of government intervention was 
required in order to make big corporate enterprises and their executives again accountable, if 
not to those owning these enterprises, then to the society as a whole.  See Douglas M. 
Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 611 (2001). 
 38.  See Julia M. Puaschunder, Socio-Psychological Motives of Socially Responsible 
Investors (Dec. 30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 
977714. 
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1930s to the 2010s.
39
  Many of those advocating for the adoption of such 
norms argue that large corporations have become so big, and their behavior 
so impactful, that such corporations should be regarded by the law as 
public or quasi-public institutions, or at least be regulated as such.
40
  These 
advocates also argue that large corporations often receive special benefits 
from state and governmental actors and thus owe an increased 
responsibility to society.
41
  Some commentators even argue that corporate 
philanthropy can also serve the goal of profit maximization.
42
  In the last 
few years, this trend has become even more popular, with the debate 
mainly focusing on whether managers of large corporations should 
sacrifice profits to advance social goals.
43
  Some have argued that the 
legitimate concerns of a corporation should include such broader objectives 
as sustainable growth, equitable employment practices, and long-term 
 
 39.  See JOHN R. DANLEY, THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1994) 
(identifying “classical” and “progressive/managerial” arguments concerning corporate 
responsibility); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1049 (1931) (arguing that the powers granted to corporate management are exercisable only 
to the benefit of all shareholders); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are 
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (Berle’s response to E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
maintaining that we must maintain emphasis on that fact that corporations exist for the sole 
purpose of making profits for shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (stating that the sole 
function of the corporation is for making profit for its stockholders combined with the fact 
that the corporation has a social service as well); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002) (outlining the history of corporate social responsibility). 
 40.  Cf. Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of 
Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (2000) (“Corporate law is primarily 
about the relationships among shareholders, boards of directors, managers, and, 
occasionally, bondholders and other creditors; questions surrounding the role of 
corporations in society arise only at the periphery of the dominant narratives of corporate 
law, if at all.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World With Corporate Law, 57 
EMORY L.J. 948, 962–63 (2008) (arguing that corporations “are state creations, and no state 
in its right mind would willfully allow for the creation of institutions as powerful as 
corporations unless there was a belief that, on balance, society would be better off because 
of their existence”). 
 42.  See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of 
Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 59 (“[T]he more closely a 
company’s philanthropy is linked to its competitive context, the greater the company’s 
contribution to society will be.”), available at http://www.expert2business.com/itson/Porter 
%20HBR%20Corporate%20philantropy.pdf. 
 43.  See generally Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility 
After Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 973 (2012) (exploring corporate social responsibility of 
locally-owned businesses); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 745 (2005) (positing about social inefficiencies if 
shareholder welfare was merely based on pure profit-maximization). 
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social and environmental well-being.
44
  Despite the existence of this debate, 
the Dodd-Frank Act includes no guidelines as to what social facets, if any 
at all, should be integrated into mainstream economic models, or how 
financial institutions can help raise awareness of such issues. 
Fourth, the Dodd-Frank Act provides insufficient clarity regarding the 
duties and responsibilities of those responsible for risk management.  Thus 
far, efforts to improve risk management have focused on emphasizing the 
duties and responsibilities of those in charge of risk management based on:  
(i) legal doctrines of fiduciary duties, which attempt to enhance risk 
oversight and reduce excessive risk-taking;
45
 (ii) stock exchange listing 
requirements; and (iii) federal regulation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Dodd-Frank fails to offer alternative means to mitigate potential problems 
in risk management or to provide methods to tackle decision makers’ biases 
in favor of excessive risk-taking. 
Thus, additional legal guidelines that will focus on risk-taking 
decision-making processes should be adopted.  Such guidelines will help 
fight negative behavioral effects and deeply-rooted undesired cultural-
institutional attitudes toward excessive risk-taking, and it will make risk 
committees take account of the kinds of concerns that the corporate social 
responsibility movement is concerned with. 
Moreover, regulators not only can, but should guide financial 
institutions in the right direction and alter their risk-taking and business 
decision-making procedures by adding behavioral-related legal 
guidelines.
46
  Indeed, evidence shows that risk management practices are 
typically driven by regulation and legislation.
47
 This means that any 
regulation created must be carefully drafted and tailored to counterbalance 
excessive risk-taking.  To create a risk mitigation strategy, regulators must 
 
 44.  See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: 
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 
1–2 (2005) (summarizing the basic claims of corporate social responsibility). 
 45.  See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 78 (2011) (discussing the 
deficiencies in state law regarding accountability for corporate management risk taking). 
 46.  At the 2012 GARP Convention in New York, senior deputy of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Michael Brosnan, “assigned the lion’s share of blame for the 
financial crisis to corporate governance and poor decision-making, rather than derivatives or 
models - the more commonly named culprits.”  Michael Eggebrecht, Financial System Is 
Stronger but Risk Management Challenges Abound, Say Regulators, GARP, Feb. 29, 2012, 
available at http://www.garp.org/risk-news-and-resources/2012/march/financial-system-is-
stronger-say-regulators.aspx. 
 47.  See Christoph Van der Elst, The Risks of Corporate Legal Principles of Risk 
Management (June 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1623526 (arguing that provisions of internal control and risk management are driven by 
regulation and legislation). 
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prioritize the types of risk on which they wish to focus, study those risks, 
and predict reactions to any proposed regulation.  While risks take many 
forms, all risks have one defining feature:  It is extremely difficult to 
predict whether any specific risk will materialize and what the 
ramifications of that risk will be.
48
  Although risks can be both external and 
internal,
49
 this Article focuses on internal risks, with events ranging from 
consequences of human errors
50
 to excessive risk-taking and even fraud.
51
  
Focusing on excessive risk-taking, most legal literature thus far has 
promoted the notion that it is primarily the result of incentive effects, and 
more specifically, of compensation schemes that reward short-term gains 
even when such gains are subsequently reversed.
52
  Indeed, it has been 
argued that prior to the financial crisis of 2008, executives’ payoffs were 
tied to highly leveraged bets on the value of financial firms’ capital.
53
  
Trying to find a solution to this problem, regulators questioned what role, if 
any, the government should play in reforming executive pay, and how to 
fix pay structures to reduce excessive risk-taking.
54
 
As explained above, this Article offers a different focus—not on 
compensation schemes, but on behavioral economics
55
 and related aspects 
 
 48.  See generally RICHARD APOSTOLIK ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF BANKING RISKS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF BANKING RISKS & RISK-BASED BANKING REGULATION, § 7.2.4 External Risk 
(2009) (providing an overview of “the risk associated with events occurring beyond the 
direct control of the bank”). 
 49.  The risk management of external events concentrates on mitigating the effect of 
potential events, which can be related to data breaches, cyber security, environmental 
emergencies and even terrorism.  Id. at 183 (providing an overview of the types of risks that 
the Basel II Accord considered as operational risk events). 
 50.  According to Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan, “errors, sloppiness 
and bad judgment” were responsible for JPMorgan’s several billion dollar loss, which 
became public in May 2012 and stemmed from a hedging strategy that backfired.  See 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, JPMorgan Discloses $2 Billion in Trading Losses, 
DEALB%K, (May 10, 2012, 10:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/jpmorgan-
discloses-significant-losses-in-trading-group/. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 29. 
 53.  See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010) (identifying key factors that provided bank executives with 
excessive incentives to take risks, including compensation structures). 
 54.  See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 29, at 1960; Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., 
The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257–59 (2010) (analyzing the performance-based compensation of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman executives that caused increased risk-taking and the eventual 
collapse of both companies, while allowing those executives to maintain their wealth); 
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 53; LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
 55.  “Behavioral economists want to understand human frailty and to find more 
compassionate, realistic and effective ways for people to avoid temptation, exert more self-
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of decision-making processes
56
 connected to excessive risk-taking.  
Although they are also applicable to the board of directors at most financial 
institutions, the guidelines described in this Article build on the Dodd-
Frank Act’s requirement to establish separate risk committees and focus on 
the obligations, composition, and working procedures of financial 
institutions’ risk committees.  These guidelines are anchored in behavioral 
economic research, which shows that individuals fail to process risk in the 
way economics supposes the traditional rational actor does.
57
 
This analysis is novel in several ways.  While many books and articles 
have been published regarding behavioral economics,
58
 none have 
attempted to suggest behavioral economic-based regulatory guidelines to 
improve financial institutions’ risk-related decision-making procedures.  
This Article speaks to this lacuna by offering guidelines to help improve 
risk evaluation and discourage excessive risk-taking for the financial 
institutions and society.  These concepts are now more relevant than ever in 
light of the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk management committee requirements.
59
 
 
control and . . . reach their long-term goals.”  DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: 
THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 9 (2010). 
 56.  Related fields include neuroeconomics, which is referenced in a very limited 
capacity in this Article.  Neuroeconomics is a new interdisciplinary field that seeks to 
explain human decision-making—the ability to process multiple alternatives and choose an 
optimal course of action.  Studies in neuroeconomics show how economic behavior can 
shape our understanding of the brain and how neuroscientific discoveries can constrain and 
guide models of economics.  See Mark Dean, What Can Neuroeconomics Tell Us About 
Economic Decision Making? (May 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Mark_Dean/Working_Paper_5.pdf. 
 57.  See generally Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 111 (2008) (observing that “individuals fail to process risk in the 
way the black-letter-law definition of recklessness presumes”). 
 58.  As a general matter, policymakers must cautiously use experimental evidence to 
draw normative policy conclusions because experimental results may not be robust across 
contexts.  See generally EXPERIMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, 
eds. 2008).  However, in the Dodd-Frank Act risk management requirement context, many 
studies provide the basis for prospective legal reforms and the creation of guidelines.  On 
boards of directors generally, see Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards 
of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 801–09 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a 
Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002); 
Donald J. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequence of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–05 
(2001); Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22 
J. MGMT. 409, 411 (1996). 
 59.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5364); see also Matteo 
Tonello, Should Your Board Have a Separate Risk Committee?, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM 
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION, http://blogs.law.ha 
rvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/12/should-your-board-have-a-separate-risk-committee/ (Feb. 12, 
2012, 10:07 AM); Carol Beaumier & Jim DeLoach, Risk Oversight:  Should Your Board 
Have a Separate Risk Committee?, THE CONFERENCE BD. (2012), available at 
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Part I commences by presenting risk management theories, in 
particular the way risk is managed in financial institutions.  Part II 
describes attempts to regulate the duties and responsibilities of those 
responsible for risk management and continues with an analysis of the 
existing relevant legal authorities on risk management and monitoring.  
Part II also explains why additional regulation or supplementary guidelines 
are needed.  Part III introduces the field of behavioral economics and 
suggests regulations on the composition, obligations and working 
procedures of risk committees based on behavioral economics studies.  
The proposed regulations will be aimed at counterbalancing negative 
biases, which can impact risk-taking in financial institutions, and 
“debiasing” the relevant actors through the structure of legal rules. 
First, focusing on the composition of risk committees, this Article 
suggests guidelines to counterbalance negative biases. In doing so, it 
examines:  (a) the power of diversity, including diversity in gender, 
minority representation and various professional backgrounds, and its 
effect on group dynamics and performance; (b) the experience factor—the 
difference in attitudes towards making riskier choices between risk 
managers with or without prior relevant experience; and (c) the choice shift 
phenomenon, pursuant to which groups make riskier decisions than 
individuals on finance-related issues, emphasizing the effect of independent 
directors on group dynamics and decision making. 
Second, focusing on the obligations of risk committees, this Article 
examines:  (a) the impact of causing individuals to become more aware of 
their honesty standards, and the value of disclosure; and (b) the illusion of 
control and dealing with uncontrollable situations. 
Third, focusing on the working procedures of risk managers and 
committees, this Article examines:  (a) the framing effect, which deals with 
the impact of presenting formulas or graphs versus verbal explanations on 
those making decisions; (b) the psychological impact that accountability 
has on performance; (c) the impact that the association of risk with 
potential disastrous outcomes has on decision makers and risk-taking; (d) 
the theme of familiarity bias and its significance in the context of risk 
perception; and (e) the hindsight bias. 
This Article concludes that the Federal Reserve should adopt rules that 
include behavioral economics-based guidelines regarding risk committees’ 
composition, obligation requirements, and working procedures.  
Alternatively, the Dodd-Frank Act should be amended to state that failure 
to comply with the recommended guidelines should be viewed as a 
 
http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N1-12.pdf&type= 
subsite. 
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violation under securities laws. 
I. MANAGING RISKS IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Risk management at financial institutions is the practice of reviewing, 
assessing, and categorizing the various types of risks to which an institution 
is exposed.
60
  Risk managers examine the risks relevant to the functioning 
and operations of their institution, conclude what the probable levels of 
losses are, monitor any other effects resulting from the examined risks, 
determine what actions will be taken to handle such risks, and attempt to 
reduce the likelihood of negative outcomes.
61
  Risk managers do all of this 
in compliance with the business environment in which they operate.
62
 
Risk management is important because it can give financial 
institutions an advantage over competitors and can even become a profit 
source.
63
  Risk management enables financial institutions to track and 
analyze risks affiliated with any change.
64
  It also helps financial 
 
 60.   See generally R.S. Raghavan, Risk Management in Banks, CHARTERED 
ACCOUNTANT, Feb. 2003, at 841, available at http://www.icai.org/resource_file/11490p841-
851.pdf (providing an overview of the categories and features of risk management in banks). 
 61.   See DOMINICK SALVATORE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 391 
(5th ed. 2009) (“[D]ecision making in business has much in common with military strategy 
and can thus be profitably analyzed using game theory. False Peacock points out that 
throughout history, military conflicts have produced a set of basic Darwinian principles that 
can serve as an excellent guideline to business managers about how to compete in the 
marketplace. Neglecting these principles can make the difference between business success 
and failure . . . . More than ever before, today’s business leaders must learn how to . . . 
muster the courage to steer the firm in radical new directions when necessary. Above all, 
firms must think and act strategically in a world of increasing global competition. Game 
theory can be particularly useful and can offer important insights in the analysis of 
oligopolistic interdependence. Indeed, more and more firms are making use of war-games 
simulations in their decision making.”); James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The 
Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 731, 735–36 (2009) (analyzing the failures of risk management in financial 
institutions). 
 62.   See Fanto, supra note 61, at 739 (outlining the decision-making strategy of risk 
managers). 
 63.  Some commentators argue that companies’ misguided efforts to examine and better 
manage risks actually poses a new kind of risk, and results in losses of profit, because too 
much focus is given to issues such as insurance coverage, fraud detection, and regulatory 
compliance, instead of other significant risks.  Indeed, pursuant to a study of 1,200 large 
corporations, “more than 60% of [shareholder] value lost over the last decade has been 
attributable to strategic risks, like being in the wrong market with the wrong product.”  Alix 
Stuart, How to Direct a Risk Team, CFO MAGAZINE, (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14633229.  Christopher Dann, a vice president at consulting 
firm Booz & Co., argued that “[e]ven financial risks like bad debt or fraud, ‘in terms of 
shareholder-value loss, are very, very minor.’”  Id. 
 64.  See generally Johnson, supra note 45 (analyzing management tactics related to the 
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institutions determine if they have infrastructure capable of dealing with 
various types of risks.
65
  Moreover, risk management keeps senior directors 
and executives alert and forces them to monitor potential risks.
66
  Finally, 
creative risk management can help identify alternative courses of action to 
adopt when handling risks.
67
 
Risk managers customarily focus on identifying possible threats 
before they materialize.  Next, they evaluate the likelihood that such threats 
will impact the financial institution’s operations, analyze the potential 
impact of such risks and prepare suitable responses to the threats.
68
  Most 
importantly, risk managers organize the identified threats based on the 
likelihood that each threat will materialize and the potential impact on the 
financial institution’s business.
69
 
A great deal of literature has been published on evaluation of the 
possible effect of threats in risk assessment.
70
  Risk evaluation takes place 
in many different industries ranging from assessment of national security 
risks
71
 to pricing natural disaster insurance.
72
  Risk management includes 
using quantitative models to analyze the probability of losing based on 
different financial decisions.  It attempts to quantify potential losses based 
on past performance of similar investments and exposures.
73
  Value at risk 
(VAR), a common financial tool and statistical measure of the possible 
downsides of assets, is often used in this risk management context.
74
  Risk 
 
Dodd Frank Act). 
 65.  Johnson, supra note 45.  
 66.  Johnson, supra note 45. 
 67.  Johnson, supra note 45. 
 68.  See Packin, supra note 16 (analyzing the elements of risk management in the 
context of preparing for unknown hazards and stress tests). 
 69.   See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina: Preparing 
Your Institution for a Catastrophic Event, 11 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 8, Oct. 2006, 
at 6 (relaying comments made by financial institutions regarding lessons they learned from 
the effects of Hurricane Katrina). 
 70.   See, e.g., RICHARD APOSTOLIK ET AL., supra note 48 (evaluating possible threats in 
banking risk assessment); MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., THE ESSENTIALS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
149-79 (2006) (surveying common threats in risk assessment). 
 71.   See, e.g., 2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT: THE BRAVE NEW 
WORLD (Theodore H. Moran ed., 2004) (assessing risks presented within the structure of the 
modern international political environment). 
 72.   Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 183, 214 (2009). 
 73.   See generally Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures 11–16 
(June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138636 
(providing an overview of enterprise risk management within financial institutions). 
 74.   See generally JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 238 (2009); 
CROUHY, supra note 70, at 149–79; Darrell Duffie & Jun Pan, An Overview of Value at Risk, 
J. DERIVATIVES 7 (Spring 1997). 
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managers use VAR to try to identify the various risks to which financial 
institutions are exposed.
75
  VAR produces an approximation of the worst-
case scenario concern by assessing at different confidence degrees,
76
 the 
minimum values of assets in the future,
77
 and providing an estimate of how 
much money can be lost in a single business day.  Risk managers make 
their VAR calculations on the key assumption that historical data about 
past investment performance are useful predictors of future performance 
and that deviations follow a bell curve distribution.
78
  Financial institutions 
utilize VAR to decide whether they are comfortable with their current risk 
exposure.  If they are not, they can modify their trading strategies.
79
  
Throughout the years, using VAR to evaluate risks has become very 
popular in the private sector and by governmental agencies.
80
  It is 
 
 75.  VAR is also used as a risk related control, much like stress tests, equity adequacy 
or liquidity controls, single transaction limits, and balance sheet limits.  See Report of Anton 
R. Valukas, Examiner, Appendix 8 at 6-19, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Bankr. No. 
08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://jenner.com/lehma 
n/VOLUME%208%20-%20APPENDICES%208-22.pdf. 
 76.  For more information on the percentages of confidence intervals that are used by 
different institutions to calculate VAR values, see Colin Lokey, Morgan Stanley Is Far 
More Risky Than Investors Think, SEEKING ALPHA (June 25, 2012), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/682691-morgan-stanley-is-far-more-risky-than-investors-
think. 
 77.   See Okamoto, supra note 72 at 214 (noting the limitations of VAR as a mechanism 
for estimating worst-case scenarios). 
 78.   See The Risks of Financial Modeling: VAR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and 
Technology, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard Bookstaber) (transcript available at 
http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2009/Oversight/10sep/B
ookstaber_Testimony.pdf) (reflecting the assumptions implicit in VAR analysis). 
 79.   See Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric: Disclosures, 
Derivatives, and the Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461–62 
(2010) (“[I]f a firm is uncomfortable with [their] exposure [after examining the VAR], the 
firm can make appropriate adjustments to its trading strategies and positions.”). 
 80.   VAR is used by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, the UK Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.  See RICHARD DALE, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS 
78 (1996); Capital Requirements for Market Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,142 (proposed July 25, 
1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. 2) (suggesting a “pre-commitment approach” for 
valuation of market risk); Sec. & Futures Auth., Board Notice 249: Implementation by SFA 
of the Capital Adequacy Directive (1995) (providing an overview of changes to the Capital 
Adequacy Directive); Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, An Internal Model-Based 
Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements 6 (1995) (offering a framework for analysis 
of market risks by banks). Sheila Bair, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, who left in 2011, has publicly stated that for years she fought the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and New York Fed over how much banks should be allowed to 
rely on VAR models.  See JPMorgan Not Triggering Major Regulatory Rethink, REUTERS, 
(June 1, 2012), available at http://www.advancedtrading.com/regulations/240001296. 
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generally considered to be an effective measurement.
81
 
Since the 2008 crisis, risk management has been in the spotlight.
82
  As 
a result, regulators have required financial institutions to establish risk 
management committees that hold documented regular meetings to discuss 
their institution’s risk profile.
83
 
Risk management has also been connected to capital regulation, and 
financial institutions are now expected to have a fixed percentage of 
leverage ratio.
84
  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
emphasized that risk management should be an essential function of 
financial institutions.
85
  The more dangerous an institution’s assets and 
businesses are, the more capital it is required to have in reserve.
86
  Thus, a 
risky institution will have less available funds to loan for investments. 
Currently, U.S. financial regulators monitor risk assessments of 
financial institutions’ risk management departments.
87
  However, financial 
institutions are free to use their own risk assessment models.
88
  While 
 
 81.   See Conti-Brown, supra note 79, at 1462 (listing the many government agencies 
that have endorsed the VAR). 
 82.   See, e.g., Financial Regulation: Review of Regulators’ Oversight of Risk 
Management Systems at a Limited Number of Large, Complex Financial Institutions: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv., S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 20-22, 24 (2009) (testimony of Orice M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Mkts. and 
Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office) (arguing that risk management models failed 
to “price . . . risky assets that precipitated the crisis”); The Financial Crisis and the Role of 
Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th 
Cong. 17-18 (2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (arguing that risk management models failed to “price . . . risky 
assets that precipitated the crisis”); Fanto, supra note 61, at 742 (assessing the growth of 
risk management in financial institutions and its shortcomings). 
 83.   See, e.g., Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, Appendix 8 at 33–34, In re 
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Bankr. No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 
2011), available at http://jenner.com/lehman/VOLUME%208%20-%20APPENDICES%2 
08-22.pdf (documenting a meeting discussing an institution’s risk). 
 84.   Leverage ratio means a fixed amount of capital in relation to the adjusted total 
assets amount.  12 C.F.R. § 3.6(b) (2012). 
 85.   Fixing a specific level of capital should be based on the financial institution’s 
assets and operations risk assessment.  See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital 
Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,294-98 (Dec. 7, 2007) (describing 
how the internal model approach, which is used to measure market risk, has broadened and 
now includes credit and operational risk as well).  See generally PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C. 
HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT & FINANCIAL SERVICES 483-84 (7th ed. 2008) (broadly 
discussing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). 
 86.  12 C.F.R. § 3.6(c) (2012). 
 87.   See DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REG., FED. RESERVE BD., BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL supp. 28 § 4070 (2005) (discussing the Bank Holding 
Company Rating System that includes a rating on an “R” component, which represents risk 
management). 
 88.   See id. (explaining how the internal model approach, which was used to measure 
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financial institutions enjoy the freedom to use their own risk assessment 
models and methods, the primary purpose of mandating separate risk 
management committees is to ensure corporate boards receives advice on 
the institution’s risk-related activities.
89
 
Financial institutions customarily allocate “substantial resources” to 
measuring, analyzing, and managing risk.
90
  The main functions of a risk 
management committee should ideally include:  (i) understanding and 
identifying all risks, (ii) ensuring that appropriate limits are in place for all 
transactions and products, and (iii) protecting the financial institutions 
against “catastrophic” loss.
91
  Risk committee members, therefore, need to 
have full access to all the relevant, complete, and accurate information 
available regarding their institution’s risk, potential exposures and market-
related information. 
Ideally, risk management committee members should be free from the 
influence of insiders or other associations that could inappropriately impact 
their judgment as a committee member.
92
  There can be some overlap 
between the members of the risk committee and the audit committee of a 
financial institution, but if the overlap is too big, the burden and the 
responsibilities of the dual committee members might negatively impact 
their ability to perform their roles as members of both committees.
93
  In 
addition, members of the risk committees may not receive direct or indirect 
compensation outside of standard fees for their service on the committee. 
Risk committees must have the ability to retain external counsel, 
consultants, independent auditors and various other experts if they are 
needed for the members to fulfill their responsibilities.
94
  Accordingly, 
 
market risk, is now extended to credit and operational risk). 
 89.  See, e.g., Enterprise Risk Management Committee Charter, ULLICO INC. (April 
22, 2010), available at http://www.ullico.com/sites/ullico.com/files/pdf-forms/RiskComm 
Charter042210.pdf (outlining duties of a particular risk management committee). 
 90.   Despite its eventual collapse, Lehman and its competitors allocated great resources 
for risk management.  By 2008, Lehman’s Global Risk Management Group (“GRMG”) had 
grown to include approximately 450 professionals with staff in each of its trading centers.  
Clearly the GRMG did not prevent Lehman’s fall, despite the fact that “[w]ithin the 
industry, Lehman’s risk management function was widely regarded as among the best.”  
Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 83, at 1-2. 
 91.  Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 83, at 6. 
 92.  See Enterprise Risk Management Committee Charter, supra note 89 (outlining 
permissible influences on risk management committee). 
 93.  John C. Partigan & Daniel McAvoy, The role and construction of risk committees, 
CORP. RESPONSIBILITY ALERT, NIXON PEABODY LLP, at 6, August 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/Corporate_%20Responsibility_Alert_08_11_2010.pdf. 
 94.  See Beaumier & DeLoach, supra note 59 (arguing that the committee should be 
able to invite to its meetings any professional or outside expert it deems appropriate in order 
to carry out its duties, and shall have the authority to approve the expenses and retention 
fees of such outside advisors). 
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members need the capability to authorize payment of professional fees.
95
  
Though risk management committees have wide discretion over the 
frequency of meetings, any recess longer than a few weeks may cause 
committee members to lose touch with ongoing issues.  In 2011, the year 
that preceded JPMorgan’s several billion dollars loss, their audit committee 
met fifteen times while their risk panel met only seven times.
96
  Following 
the losses, JPMorgan announced that its board’s audit and risk committees 
would meet every week for at least several months.
97
  Accordingly, it 
appears that in order for risk committee members to be kept up-to-date with 
current matters, weekly or daily risk exposure and policy compliance 
reports detailing the institution’s investments and market circumstances are 
appropriate.  Finally, the risk committee should be able to discuss issues 
with the institution’s audit committee, executives and management, 
external counsel, and independent consultants.  This would afford the 
committee the ability to analyze pending issues, state and federal 
regulations and developments, the institution’s risk management programs, 
and others matters of concern.
98
 
The risk committee must keep accurate minutes and maintain records 
of any written consent actions that were agreed upon without a meeting to 
ensure that all actions approved and decided by the committee are 
documented.  Both the minutes and the consent records must be kept in the 
financial institution’s corporate books and records.
99
  
Risk management committees are typically responsible for certain 
types of goals and tasks.
100
  First, they need to determine their financial 
institution’s risk management framework, including the risk governance 
structure, competencies, tolerance, and management initiatives, and they 
must frequently review it.
101
  As part of this review, the committee must 
also coordinate the institution’s risk management activities and decide how 
 
 95.  In Lehman’s case, for example, GRMG’s mission was to “protect and enhance the 
value of the franchise by proactively identifying, evaluating, monitoring and controlling 
Firm market, credit and operational risks.” In addition to understanding and measuring the 
risks associated with the firm’s business activities, GRMG was responsible for developing 
various risk related policies, procedures, models, and limits.”  Report of Anton R. Valukas, 
supra note 83, at 2. 
 96.  Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, J.P. Morgan Plans Risk-Panel Shift, WALL ST. 
J. (May 25, 2012, 6:24 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702 
304707604577426533056645956.html. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., Enterprise Risk Management Committee Charter, supra note 90 
(describing which matters the risk management committee handles). 
 99.  Id.  Some of the guidelines I propose, this one included, were inspired by the 
ULLICO Charter.  
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
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the risk management strategy and related activities impact the institution’s 
general business and financial strategy.
102
  Second, risk management 
committees should ideally review their institutions’ risk exposure by 
geographical division.  This review should focus primarily on capital, 
earnings and compliance with the financial institution’s risk policies 
regarding the types of risks mentioned above,
103
 including, inter alia, credit 
risk,
104
 market risk,
105
 operational risk,
106
 underwriting risk,
107
 and liquidity 
risk.
108
  Third, risk management committees should assess possible changes 
in geographical, political, environmental and demographic conditions, and 
relevant legislative, legal, and regulatory provisions.
109
  Fourth, risk 
 
 102.  At JP Morgan, risk committees “are established at the Firm and business levels. 
These committees periodically perform comprehensive reviews of the risk profiles of their 
businesses and the Firm.”  TOM DAULA, RISK MANAGEMENT AT MORGAN STANLEY: AN 
OVERVIEW (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.morganstanley.com/about/ir/presentatio 
ns/risk_tom_daula02_14_06.pdf. 
 103.   Lehman’s GRMG in the United States was structured to include several separate 
departments, including Market Risk Management, Credit Risk Management, Operational 
Risk Management, Quantitative Risk Management, Sovereign Risk Management, 
Investment Management Division Risk Management, and Risk Control and Analysis. 
Outside of the United States, GRMG was divided into regional sub-departments.  See 
Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 83, at 2 (discussing the Lehman GRMG). 
 104.  Credit risks are possible losses generated from defaults of payments of principal 
and interest on consumer or corporate loans made by a financial institution.  Fanto, supra 
note 61, at 736.  For a more detailed analysis of credit risk modeling see generally Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 311–22 (2012). 
 105.  Market risks are possible losses generated from changes in the value of security 
prices due to changes in interests or default rates.  ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLON 
CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 266 
(6th ed. 2008). 
 106.  Operational risks are risks of loss resulting from failed or inadequate internal 
procedures, human or systems errors, or external events.  The Basel II Accord identifies five 
types of operational risks:  internal process risks, people risks, legal risks, systemic risks and 
external risks.  It also provides three approaches to calculating such risks:  the Basic 
Indicator Approach, the Standardized Approach, and the Advanced Measurement Approach.  
APOSTOLIK ET AL., supra note 48, at 179–200. 
 107.  Underwriting risks generally refer to the risk of loss on underwriting activity in the 
insurance or securities industries.  See THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AGENCY, INSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING RISK CHECKLIST AND MANUAL, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer 
/manual/hoken_e/h08.pdf (explaining underwriting and insurance related risks from the 
Financial Supervisory Agency, the Japanese agency that oversees banking, securities and 
exchange, and insurance). 
 108.  Liquidity risks concern situations where financial institutions fall short of cash and 
are not able to borrow cash from other financial institutions or sell assets.  One example is 
the risk of a “run on the bank,” which SIFIs face because a depositor can demand the return 
of their funds at any time.  If there is mass-demand of depositors to retrieve their deposits at 
once, the SIFI may not be able to accommodate these requests.  Okamoto, supra note 72, at 
193. 
 109.   As with Lehman’s risk management department, each global or regional head of a 
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management committees should obtain and review periodic internal reports 
on their management’s communication of risk related policies across the 
institution, the framework of risk responsibility and assignment throughout 
the institution, and the risk management perspective of parties interacting 
with the institution, such as rating agencies, legislative authorities, 
customers, distributors, employees’ unions, and more.  Fifth, risk 
management committees should meet with senior executives, auditors, and 
legal personnel to review, analyze, and evaluate important risks and 
exposures, courses of action adopted to minimize any potential risks or 
exposures analyzed, and the institution’s underlying policies in connection 
with risk management.  Sixth, risk management committees should 
evaluate their institution’s guidelines on categorizing, prioritizing, and 
reporting risks in order to enhance efficient risk management.  Lastly, the 
risk management committees need to provide their institution’s boards with 
frequent reports on the committee’s work, recommended changes, notable 
improvements, suggestions and special progress that was achieved, as well 
as relevant findings obtained by the committee.  
II. DUTIES ASSOCIATED WITH RISK MANAGEMENT 
In recent years, Congress and regulators have attempted to address 
deficiencies in risk management that contributed to the 2008 crisis.
110
  
Arguing that enterprise risk management is an internal affairs issue subject 
to state law rather than federal regulatory oversight, commentators have 
objected.
111
  They contend that federal regulation of enterprise risk 
management is unnecessary, unsuccessful, and undesirable.
112
  These 
commentators ignore three significant issues.  First, while systemic risk is 
important, weaknesses in enterprise risk management only became 
apparent after major financial institutions suffered great losses.
113
  Enabling 
 
risk department or sub-committee should report about any such changes to the firm’s risk 
management committee directly.  Id. 
 110.  See sources cited infra note 143. 
 111.  See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (criticizing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
altering the relationship between state and federal regulators). 
 112.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1789–95 (2011) (arguing that Delaware’s 
corporate regulatory infrastructure is better suited than federal regulators to address 
corporate law); E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through State 
and Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 13 
(2010) (arguing that precedent “should insulate risk management from judicial review”). 
 113.  See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Post-
Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1306–12 (2010) 
(discussing the collapse of Bear Stearns). 
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private businesses to shift the negative externalities of their actions to the 
public lowers social welfare and results in suboptimal outcomes.
114
  
Second, while enterprise risk management has been categorized as an 
internal corporate affairs issue,
115
 some scholars argue that state law 
inadequately regulates corporate governance conflicts between 
shareholders’ long-term interests in the firm and directors and executive 
officers’ shorter-term interests.
116
  Third, state legislatures and courts face 
considerable pressure to adopt and maintain executive-friendly corporate 
governance policies.
117
  Indeed, following many years of competition 
among various states to boost the number of entities incorporated in their 
jurisdictions, Delaware’s success has caused many states to conform their 
standards to those of Delaware.
118
  Moreover, Delaware courts have 
recently deferred to directors in claims ranging from directors’ breach of 
fiduciary duties to their failure to adopt reasonable enterprise risk 
management policies.
119
  It thus seems unlikely that states will impose 
enhanced fiduciary obligations to oversee enterprise risk management. 
Prior to the 2008 crisis, attempts to enhance risk management were 
based on three main sources, all of which emphasized the duties of those 
responsible for risk management:  (i) legal doctrines of fiduciary duties 
found in state statutes and common law accountability standards,
120
 (ii) 
 
 114.  See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap 
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 175 (2011) (“The ability of market participants to 
extract and internalize benefits from the commons resource, while shifting the costs of their 
self-aggrandizing activities to other groups, presents one of the most significant concerns in 
commons and financial markets.”). 
 115.  See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at 
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 106–07 (2010) (discussing how companies manage 
risks internally); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967, 969 (2009) (describing enterprise risk management as how a business 
organization anticipates and responds to “uncertainties associated with the organization’s 
strategic objectives”). 
 116.  See generally Johnson, supra note 45 at 56 (arguing that state governments and 
courts “deferring to the directors and executive officers neglects a critical conflict that 
illustrates the classic agency problem”). 
 117.  See generally Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and 
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57 (2009) (discussing Delaware’s 
preeminence in corporate law, and possible threats to that status).  But see Jonathan R. 
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 
ECON. POL’Y R. 91, 92 (2003) (arguing that bank directors should be forced to take solvency 
risk explicitly and systematically into account when making decisions, or else make it clear 
that such directors should and would face personal liability for any failure to do so). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See generally Johnson, supra note 45 at 60 (“Delaware courts’ narrow and 
deferential interpretation of directors’ fiduciary obligations may not offer a viable 
mechanism for imposing liability for directors’ failure to monitor enterprise risk.”). 
 120.  See Johnson, supra note 45 at 78 (examining state approaches to risk management 
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stock exchange listing requirements and the NASDAQ Stock Market,
121
 
and (iii) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
122
  
The first source focuses on the concept of directors’ fiduciary 
duties,
123
 which in the United States is mainly based on Delaware corporate 
law.
124
  Directors in a solvent corporation have a fiduciary duty to the 
corporate enterprise, including its shareholders, but when the corporation 
becomes insolvent, the duty extends to, and focuses on, the corporation’s 
creditors to protect the remaining assets by paying off creditor claims.
125
  
There is even some precedent holding that a corporation’s directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the bondholders and other creditors if the corporation is 
in the zone of insolvency,
126
 between solvency and insolvency.
127
  Indeed, 
certain courts have held that the fiduciary duties owed to insolvent 
corporations apply to situations of near-insolvency,
128
 and therefore 
 
oversight). 
 121.  See generally Darren C. Skinner, Director Responsibilities and Liability Exposure 
in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 PRAC. LAW. 29 (2006), available at http://www.arnoldpor 
ter.com/resources/documents/Practica_Lawyer_Skinner.pdf. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1862) 
(“[Directors] hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with 
fidelity, not for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the 
corporation.”). 
 124.  In the U.S., corporations are creatures of the law of the state of their incorporation, 
and thus, their fiduciary duties vary by state.  Since most publicly traded Fortune 500 
companies are incorporated in Delaware, Delaware law forms the backbone of U.S. 
fiduciary duty law.  See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 
1990), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (noting that many states adopt Delaware 
law). 
 125.  See, e.g., Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon (In re Zale Corp.), 196 B.R. 348, 354 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (noting that Delaware law establishes a fiduciary duty for trustees 
of an insolvent corporation to ensure that “the assets of the corporation becomes a trust for 
the benefit of the corporation’s creditors”).  This is referred to as the trust fund doctrine, 
whereby an insolvent corporation’s assets are to be kept in trust for distribution to its 
creditors. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (8th ed. 2004); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. 
Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 
BUS. LAW. 239, 244 (1992). 
 126.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007) (discussing 
the fiduciaries duties owed to creditors by the directors of near-insolvent corporations, but 
arguing that concern over zone of insolvency cases is overstated). 
 127.  See, e.g., Cory Dean Kandestin, Note, The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent 
Firms: Eliminating the “Near-Insolvency” Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1251 (2007) 
(“[A] corporation need not be insolvent in fact in order to trigger a fiduciary duty owed to 
creditors.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Jewel Recovery, 196 B.R. at 354–55 (stating that Delaware may have 
expanded the duty insolvent corporations owed to creditors to apply to near-insolvent 
corporations); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’n. Corp., 17 DEL J. 
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creditors could rightfully challenge a board’s decision if they believed the 
decision breached the directors’ fiduciary duties owed to the creditors.
129
  
While the law applied to near insolvent corporations is not always clear, it 
permits directors of an enterprise in the zone of insolvency to consider 
creditor interests, and avoid taking excessive risks.
130
  Indeed, it has long 
been held that directors of insolvent corporations owe a direct fiduciary 
duty to creditors in their capacity as trustees of corporate assets.
131
 
Fiduciary duties take two typical forms.
132
  First, directors owe a duty 
of loyalty to prioritize the interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
over their own.
133
  Second, directors owe a general duty of care, both in 
process and substance,
134
 to act in good faith and to exercise reasonable 
diligence in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders.
135
 
When directors violate their duty of care, they are no longer protected 
from judicial second-guessing of their decisions by the business judgment 
 
CORP. L. 1099, 1155 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“[W]here a corporation is operating in the 
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk 
bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”). 
 129.  Carrieri v. Jobs.com Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 534 n.24 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Weaver v. 
Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 583–84 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997)) (“[U]nder both Delaware law and 
Texas law, corporate insiders may have a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors even 
when the corporation [i]s not insolvent. . . .”); Jewel Recovery, 196 B.R. at 354–55. 
 130.  See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. at 1155–56 n.55 (explaining 
how the zone of insolvency can change incentives). 
 131.  See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 
1982) (“[W]hen the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts 
from the stockholders to the creditors.”).  But cf. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp. Inc., 
863 A.2d 772, 788–89 (Del. Ch. 2004) (inferring that there might not be an affirmative duty 
in the zone of insolvency, but rather that directors could profit from a “shield” to protect 
them from shareholder suits). 
 132.  But see Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1309, 1315–16 (2008) (arguing that, “it may make sense to eliminate the concept of 
fiduciary duty from corporate law altogether. . . .  [D]irectors should merely be obliged to 
honor the terms of the firm’s investment contracts, even when they lead to decisions that are 
not value-maximizing ex post for the investors as a group.”). 
 133.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2d ed. West 2010) 
 134.  See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988) (noting that courts can 
theoretically review the procedural aspects of a director’s decision, and review the substance 
of the transaction). 
 135.  Id.; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
(discussing the duty of loyalty owed by directors and board members); Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the business judgment rule does not 
protect grossly negligent directors); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 
(Del. Ch. 1963) (limiting board liability for failing to discover employee misconduct to a 
negligence standard of reasonableness and good faith); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 
8.30(a)-(b) (3d ed. Supp. 1998/99). 
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rule,
136
 a presumption that directors act in a reasonably informed fashion 
when making business decisions.
137
  However, it is difficult to prove that 
the business decisions were not made in good faith, as opposed to simply 
being inconsistent with how a reasonable person would act under similar 
circumstances, or simply not made in the best interest of the corporation.  
The suitability of a judicial review is often unclear when it is alleged that 
directors breached a duty that did not involve disloyalty.  No duty is 
breached merely because a director made business determinations that did 
not end up benefiting the corporation, even if at the time the determinations 
were made most observers believed they were bad.  Moreover, pursuant to 
the business judgment rule, substantive review of decisions is not allowed 
because decisions made appeared “dumb”
138
 or “irrational”
139
 in retrospect.  
Similarly, courts will not hold fiduciaries liable for “a failure to comply 
with the aspirational ideal of best practices. . . .”
140
  Indeed, the business 
judgment rule arises from a belief that “investors’ wealth would be lower if 
managers’ decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial review.”
141
 
 
 136.  See, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 128 (2004); accord, Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment 
Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 631 (2000) (scholars debate whether it a “rule,” or a “standard” 
with no “bright-line” separating acceptable from unacceptable conduct). 
 137.  Although the law is not clear on whether the business judgment rule applies to 
decisions made during insolvency, several courts have specifically declined to apply it.  See, 
e.g., Mims v. Kennedy Capital Mgmt., Inc. (In re Performance Nutrition, Inc.), 239 B.R. 93, 
111 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (“[T]he business judgment rule may be wholly inapplicable in 
a case where the corporation is insolvent.”); Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Gen. Homes 
Corp. (In re Gen. Homes Corp.), 199 B.R. 148, 151–52 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) (“[W]hile 
the business judgment rule may apply to the decisions of solvent corporations, it has no 
consequence in the context of a conservatorship.”); see also Toy King Distribs., Inc. v. 
Liberty Sav. Bank (In re Toy King Distribs., Inc.), 256 B.R. 1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(applying the rule in favor of creditors). 
 138.  Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1672 (2001) (arguing that 
courts correctly stay out of “typical business decisions” even when the decisions are 
“probably pretty dumb”). 
 139.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“[W]hether a judge or jury . . . believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of 
wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no grounds for 
director liability, so long as the court determines the process employed was either rational or 
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”). 
 140.  In re The Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 141.  FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 93 (1991); see also, In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (holding that not 
adopting the business rule “would expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-
equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests.”); 
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate 
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2005) (“Delaware’s emphasis on responsible corporate 
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Following the 2008 financial crisis for which risk management was 
partially blamed,
142
 attention shifted to boards and their duty to monitor.
143
  
This duty to monitor, which has roots in Delaware case law,
144
 has been 
used in arguments for preserving directors’ accountability for risk 
management oversight.  For example, in a 2009 lawsuit, plaintiffs argued 
that Citigroup directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to 
diligently monitor the business’ risks or make a good faith effort to follow 
procedures in order to be fully informed regarding the financial 
institution’s risk exposure.
145
  The Citigroup court dismissed the suit, 
holding that the allegations regarding bad business decisions should be 
evaluated under a different standard of liability, not that of the failure to 
monitor.
146
  Invoking the business judgment rule, the court also held that 
the directors did not intentionally disregard their responsibility.
147
  This 
Delaware legal approach weakened accountability for failed risk 
management oversight.
148
  However, suggesting that the Delaware courts 
are making a mistake every time they decline to rule in plaintiffs’ favor is 
 
governance . . . is intended to promote good decision making by directors, thereby obviating 
the specter of judicial second-guessing.”). 
 142.   See, e.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 3-4 (2008) (testimony of 
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.); Financial 
Regulation: Review of Regulators’ Oversight of Risk Management Systems at a Limited 
Number of Large, Complex Financial Institutions: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., 
and Inv., S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 20-22, 24 (2009) 
(testimony of Orice M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Mkts. and Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office); Fanto, supra note 61, at 742. 
 143.  Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 721 (2010).  
References were also made to Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 
1963), which is an earlier Delaware case where the board’s obligation to monitor activities 
and corporate violations was recognized. 
 144.  In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (introducing Delaware’s duty to 
monitor doctrine). 
 145.  In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(pursuant to the suit, the risks that were not properly monitored and even ignoreddespite  
the existence of noticeable “red flags,” related to the subprime mortgage marketalmost 
resulted in the insolvency of Citigroup).  See generally Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty 
to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153 (2010). 
 146.  See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (holding that plaintiffs might assert two types 
of claims regarding directors’ violation of their fiduciary duties to monitor the business’ 
operations:  First, that the directors made a grossly negligent decision that resulted in losses, 
which might be not ideal, but nonetheless decisions that fall under the business judgment 
rule’s standards; second, that the directors acted in bad faith by failing to establish a proper 
monitoring system); see also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123–28 (characterizing the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the first category of the Caremark case claims). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See Johnson, supra note 45, at 92. 
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not wise either.  It is not clear that adopting a more aggressive oversight 
approach would always mean better oversight on fiduciary duty issues.  
Therefore, the one firm conclusion that Citigroup illustrates is that the 
Delaware courts are not well-positioned to police fiduciary duty risk 
management-related issues.
149
 
Further emphasizing the duties and responsibilities for risk 
management are stock exchange listing requirements addressing risk, 
specifically the New York Stock Exchange’s listing requirements adopted 
in 2002.
150
  Pursuant to the requirements, the audit committees of listed 
corporate entities have to assume specific responsibility for oversight of 
their corporation’s risk management tactics and procedures.
151
  This 
requirement attempted to persuade boards to take a more active role in risk 
supervision from a compliance perspective.
152
  Nevertheless, it is evident 
from the 2008 crisis that boards must be more committed to guarantee their 
corporation’s risk management procedures are aligned with their approved 
strategies and goals and that management has in place the processes needed 
to govern those risks. 
The third source providing requirements for those responsible for risk 
management is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which mandates that corporations 
and boards must comply with certain legal requirements.
153
  Such 
requirements include the maintenance of financial and disclosure controls 
and the certification of periodical financial statements involving risk 
 
 149.  See ERIC J. PAN, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE DUTY TO MONITOR UNDER 
DELAWARE LAW: FROM CAREMARK TO CITIGROUP 13 (2010) available at 
http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=DN-004-10.pdf&ty 
pe=subsite (“Delaware courts have refrained from holding corporate directors responsible 
for harmful outcomes that do not involve wrongful or illegal acts. By doing so, however, 
Delaware courts might have encouraged boards to be either ignorant or unquestioning of 
excessive risk taking by officers. The absence of adequate board oversight is partially to 
blame for the catastrophic losses suffered by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and 
Citigroup.”). 
 150.  New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules § 
303A.07(c)(iii)(D) (New York: NYSE Euronext, 2009), available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (outlining the audit committee’s responsibility for risk). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See MARK S. BEASLEY, BOARD AND AUDIT COMMITTEE INVOLVEMENT IN RISK 
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT, AM. INST. FOR CPAS, (2010), available at http://www.aicpa.org/ 
ForThePublic/AuditCommitteeEffectiveness/AuditCommitteeBrief/DownloadableDocumen
ts/board%20and%20audit%20com%20role%20in%20risk%20oversight.pdf (“External 
drivers are encouraging boards to oversee management’s ERM practices by assigning 
explicit responsibilities to audit committees for risk oversight . . . the NYSE rules call for 
the audit committee to discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which this is 
accomplished and to discuss the entity’s major financial risk exposures.”). 
 153.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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management.
154
 
Given the potential dire consequences of failed risk management 
oversight for the economy, it is clear that additional sources of legal 
authority emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of those responsible 
for risk management should be adopted.  Such sources of legal authority 
should also enable substantive second-guessing of business decisions 
regarding excessive risk-taking by large financial institutions.
155
  Risk 
should be avoided at all cost when a significant financial institution is 
already in financial distress, or in the zone of insolvency, as it is possible 
that its actions run contrary to the business judgment rule.
156
  Further, it has 
been held that taking risky actions when a financial institution is already in 
financial distress, or in the zone of insolvency, should be viewed as 
something done in bad faith.
157
  Thus, such actions could potentially be 
considered a violation of directors’ fiduciary duties.
158
  Moreover, it should 
be considered whether mandating risk monitoring at financial institutions 
should be a part of the directors’ fiduciary duties, similar to the rationale in 
Caremark.
159
  In addition, such arguments can also be supported by the 
“discretionary” approach, which states that when an institution is in the 
zone of insolvency, its directors are entitled to consider business 
approaches that are less risky than what a shareholder seeking to maximize 
share value would consider optimal.
160
  Further, as mentioned above, it is 
well established that once an enterprise is in a state of insolvency, the 
fiduciary duties to the enterprise’s creditors exist under the Bankruptcy 
 
 154.  See, e.g., Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (mandating that subjected 
corporations must include in their annual reports a report of management on the 
corporation’s internal control over financial reporting); Section 302 (mandating that certain 
senior executives of publicly traded corporations certify the appropriateness of their 
corporations’ financial statements and disclosures and certify that they fairly present, in all 
material respects, the operations and financial condition of the corporation); Section 906 
(requiring certain senior executives to certify that the periodic report containing financial 
statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
 155.  See Branson, supra note 37, at 636–39 (discussing corporate institutions’ social 
responsibilities). 
 156.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–74 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by 
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 712–14 (Del. 2009). 
 157.  See generally Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (holding that taking such risks is a breach of fiduciary duties). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(holding that a board of directors has a duty to make sure that suitable “information and 
reporting systems” are in place, and to make “timely, accurate information” available to the 
board and top management in order for the board to do its work). 
 160.  See Kandestin, supra note 127, at 1239.  
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Code and state law.
161
 
Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that efforts to hold directors 
accountable for risk management failures would threaten to morph into 
holding directors liable for bad business outcomes in general.
162
  Adding to 
this is the fact that state courts, as Citigroup demonstrates, are not currently 
well-positioned to police such issues.  Therefore, the judicial interpretation 
and view of the standards for second-guessing of business decisions 
concerning risk-taking remained unchanged.  While the Dodd-Frank Act 
represents a substantial financial regulatory reform, it does not properly 
regulate risk management.  The Dodd-Frank Act does not include any 
additional sources of legal authority emphasizing the duties and 
responsibilities of those managing risk.  Instead, the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
provisions focus on enhancing risk oversight at financial institutions and 
are too weak and inadequate to properly advance stability in the financial 
market.
163
 
III. COUNTERBALANCING BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS WITH THE GOAL OF 
REDUCING EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING 
While economic incentives are efficient in convincing individuals to 
choose between options in a way they would not have otherwise, the use of 
behavioral effects, including social/group influences and 
psychological/cognitive biases, is a different way of incentivizing corporate 
risk managers and directors.  Unfortunately, behavioral effects are hard to 
measure or analyze thoroughly.  Moreover, recent studies in behavioral 
economics indicate that individuals fail to process risk in the way the 
black-letter definitions of risk suppose, and call into question the degree to 
which decisions can simply be categorized as “conscious” or 
“unconscious.”
164
  This might be the reason why the impact of social 
influences and psychological biases on financial decision making has only 
 
 161.  See Kandestin, supra note 127, at 1238 (“[I]t is at least clear that upon insolvency 
in fact, a duty is owed to creditors.”); see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., 
Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–03 (Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., 
Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 n.67 (Del. Ch. 2004) (creditors of an insolvent enterprise are owed 
fiduciary duties and can bring derivative actions for breach). 
 162.  See generally Bainbridge, supra note 115 (for arguments that directors should not 
be held liable for risk management failures). 
 163.  See generally Johnson, supra note 45 (calling for reforms addressing cognitive bias 
and structural limitations inherent to group decision making, and thus to boards of 
directors). 
 164.  See generally Rapp, supra note 57 (arguing that recklessness as it is defined in tort 
law is inconsistent with people’s actual behavior and thought processes when facing risk 
and uncertainty). 
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recently begun to draw significant scholarly attention. 
Behavioral economics is a relatively new and interrelated discipline.  
The field of behavioral economics was developed as a result of a great deal 
of experimental research done in behavioral psychology that focused on 
how individuals actually behave.
165
  A key notion in behavioral economics 
is that people do not necessarily conduct themselves based on the rational 
risk-averse utility-maximizer
166
 predicted by conventional neoclassical 
economics
167
 or pursuant to traditional law and economics theories.
168
  
Accordingly, some deviations from the rational utility-maximizer model 
are predictable, and not just a random error, but the result of systematic 
biases. 
Behavioral economics, and perhaps neuroeconomics in the future,
169
 
 
 165.  See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, 
Present & Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3 (Colin F. Camerer et al., 
eds., 2004) (discussing generally the approach and methods of behavioral economics). 
 166.  See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
154 (2003) (noting that the rational actor model is criticized for failing to take into account 
human irrationality). 
 167.  See John B. Davis, Behavioral Economics, Neuroeconomics, and Identity, in 
ECONOMICS AND THE MIND 58 (Barbara Montero & Mark D. White eds., 2007) (discussing 
how behavioral economics and neuroeconomics more accurately explain the choices and 
behaviors of the individual actor than neoclassical economic theory). 
 168.  Rapp, supra note 57, at 153.  See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, (1998) (discussing how 
assumptions about human behavior employed by neoclassical economics could be improved 
by empirical insights). 
 169.  Neuroeconomics, which is a related but much younger discipline, is founded on 
recent research in the understanding of the cognitive processes at work in human thought 
and mainly deals with choice as the result of brain activity.  See generally Davis, supra note 
167; Peter Coy, Why Logic Often Takes a Backseat, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 27, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-03-27/why-logic-often-takes-a-backseat 
(discussing the areas of the brain that become active in certain decision making).  
Neuroeconomics is “the study of how the embodied brain interacts with its external 
environment to produce economic behavior.”  Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and 
Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 44 (2005) (footnote omitted) (economics, in 
this context, deals with budget constraints and not necessarily with money).  Accordingly, 
this scientific discipline uses modern developments in brain imaging technology to examine 
methodically how brain function prompts specific behaviors.  See Kevin McCabe et al., 
Lessons from Neuroeconomics for the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR 68 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005) (advocating incorporating 
neuroeconomic findings into the study of law).  This discipline helps to advance behavioral 
economics in that it provides a neurobiological reasoning for some of the departures from 
rational action observed in experiments conducted by behavioral economists.  See Erin Ann 
O’Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 21, 25 (Semir 
Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2004) (examining the ways that neuroscience can 
improve legal processes). 
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can greatly contribute to law development.  Indeed, law generally should be 
written and applied to account for the manner in which humans make 
decisions.  While that may not have been possible to do in the past, recent 
developments in behavioral economics shed new light on how humans 
make decisions.  For example, we now know that behavioralism’s insights 
into human decision-making call into question the degree to which humans 
are intentionally able to disregard known risks
170
 and undermine the 
validity of the concept of “known risk.”
171
 
Behavioral law and economics takes the psychology-based insights 
from behavioral economics and incorporates them into legal frameworks.  
The policy implications of behavioral law and economics were popularized 
by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein,
172
 who argued that such studies could 
and should be incorporated into the cognitive foundations of corporate 
governance law. 
Nevertheless, despite the field’s popularity, some commentators have 
great concerns about the challenges of basing policy recommendations on 
evidence of bounded rationality.
173
  Accordingly, scholars have expressed 
concerns that (i) important gaps remain in our understanding of how and 
why people make choices;
174
 (ii) behavioral law and economics neglect 
individual and situational differences in rationality and fail to recognize 
that not all individuals are the same, which makes it difficult to predict 
behavior;
175
 and (iii) corporate governance should be flexible enough to 
 
 170.  See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted 
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) 
(criticizing the application of behavioral psychology to law). 
 171.  See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the 
Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1267 (1990) (stating that the 
“known risk” concept applies more to torts and criminal law scholarship). 
 172.  See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (2008) (making a case for “libertarian paternalism,” 
the practice of making strategic determination of default options to “nudge” individuals into 
making better choices in the face of their cognitive defects). 
   173.  For more on bounded rationality see Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCI., 297 (1999) (explaining that bounded rationality claims 
that decision-makers are rational, meaning they are goal-oriented and adaptive, but noting 
that they sometimes fail, even in important decisions, because of human cognitive and 
emotional architecture).  
 174.  See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 738–39 (2005) 
(discussing the management overconfidence in corporate governance). 
 175.  See generally Russell B. Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 4-1, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstr 
act=496462 (discussing how heuristic-based reasoning poses policy challenges for legal 
scholars).  See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to 
Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 627-29 (2002) (analyzing 
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accommodate different personalities, and thus, no single regulatory 
response is optimal for managing overconfidence.
176
 
But even with the criticism voiced against it, behavioral law and 
economics is still considered a growing, useful, and popular source of 
scholarship, and it is widely believed that it can and should supplement 
substantive economic tools.
177
  More specifically, given the significant 
impact that social and psychological biases have, and since many of these 
biases are remediable with proper regulation, behavioral law can help 
counterbalance the negative biases’ effects in the context of risk-taking.  
Accordingly, rather than continue to struggle with dictating formulas and 
strict definitions regarding risk calculations to the financial industry, 
regulators should focus some of their efforts on creating guidelines that will 
help enhance risk committees’ decision-making processes and reduce the 
impact of undesirable biases on unwanted or excessive risk taking.  In an 
attempt to shed light on what these biases can be in the context of risk 
taking at financial institutions and how to counterbalance them, this Article 
offers such guidelines focused on risk committees’ composition, 
obligations, and working procedures. 
 
“The Context Problem” in applying cognitive psychology research to public institutions); 
Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case 
of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 731 (2000) (“Not only can disparate 
contexts lead to different cognitions, but each party to a particular transaction may have 
different motivations, experiences, practices, and goals.  Certainly, each party’s outlook can 
influence the way that party receives and processes information.”) (footnote omitted); 
Mitchell, supra note 170 (arguing that people are more rational than behavioralism might 
suggest); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) 
(arguing that people are not equally irrational and so a singular regulatory response to 
address their behavior might be imprudent); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral 
Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1643-44 (2000) (expressing 
concern about behavioral law and economics’ neglect of the contextual determinants of 
behavior); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U CHI. L. REV. 279, 299 
(2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000)) (“The 
tendency to focus on one or two cognitive processes at the expense of institutional context 
seems to be widespread among the behavioralists.”); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future 
of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768–69 (1998) (“First, a 
number of the observed biases appear under certain circumstances, but not in others.  It is 
difficult to predict how, when, or whether many of these biases will manifest themselves in 
the real world because scholars do not yet fully understand why many of them exist—they 
are empirical results awaiting a full theoretical explanation.”). 
 176.  See Paredes, supra note 174, at 739 (arguing that managers’ varied individual traits 
require flexible corporate governance regimes). 
 177.  See generally Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 8, at A31 (arguing that 
policymakers are applying behavioral economics to address issues it was not intended to 
resolve). 
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A. Risk Committees’ Composition 
1. Diversity 
A risk committee composed of heterogeneous individuals can help 
counterbalance undesired behavioral effects on risk-taking, which include 
cognitive-related biases as well as group-related biases.  Specific cultural 
dissimilarities can explain why individuals with comparable training, 
similar professional experience, and the same exposure to relevant 
information on the matters before them, can reach distinctive judgments.
178
  
Moreover, homogenous groups tend to be at ease around each other, which 
might be preferable as far as group comfort is concerned, but is less 
preferable in terms of exploring sophisticated solutions to problems.  
Accordingly, the best teams are often composed of people with diverse 
perspectives and unique opinions.
179
   
If a team only includes members from one end of a spectrum, many 
possible solutions to existing problems may not even be considered.
180
  
Thus, parties assembling risk committees should make efforts to recruit a 
diversified pool of suitable and talented individuals.  Similarly, adopting a 
practice of having company-wide risk committees in the financial-services 
industry can greatly improve efficiency.  Although the finance department 
will take the lead, “including the businesses as well as the key support 
groups on a level playing field to identify risks and make decisions helps 
create more ‘risk-spotters’ across the organization.”
181
 
a) Gender And Risk-Taking 
More specifically, companies could attempt to balance the number of 
men and women on risk committees.
182
  To date, despite recent efforts to 
 
 178.  Robert A. Olsen & Constance M. Cox, The Influence of Gender on the Perception 
and Response to Investment Risk:  The Case of Professional Investors, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. 
MARKETS 29 (2001). 
 179.  See e.g. Richard Florida, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS (2005) (arguing that 
diverse cities are more innovative and have a better quality of life). 
 180.  Stuart, supra note 63. 
 181.  Stuart, supra note 63 (quoting Hank Prybylski, a risk management expert at Ernst 
& Young). 
 182.  See generally John Coates, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG AND WOLF:  RISK TAKING, 
GUT FEELINGS AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST (2012) (stating that currently women 
only make up at most five percent of the traders in the financial world and arguing that this 
is not because women are less talented at trading).  In fact, Coates cites to a result 
“announced in 2009 by Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research, which found that over the 
previous nine years hedge funds run by women had significantly outperformed those run by 
men.”  Id. at 272.  Finally, Coates identifies a feedback loop between testosterone and 
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increase the number of women on corporate boards for equality reasons,
183
 
gender equality does not exist.
184
  Further, as detailed below, behavioral 
economics studies have demonstrated that female professional investors 
might be less risk-seeking and less ruthless in their business strategies, 
which are traits that can be more positively viewed in the context of SIFIs’ 
 
success that dramatically lowers the fear of risk in men, and recommends altering “the 
biology of the market by increasing the number of women and older men in it.”  Id. at 275. 
 183.  This inequality is not new and the phenomenon’s dimensions are difficult to ignore.  
Among the Fortune 1000, there are 139 boards that have no women directors; and women 
comprise less than fifteen percent of all directors.  See CTPARTNERS, WOMEN ON BOARDS: 
REVIEW & OUTLOOK, available at http://www.ctnet.com/uploadedFiles/Women-On-
Boards_2012.pdf (examining the paucity of women in the business world and suggesting 
solutions).  Accordingly, pursuant to section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System established its Office of Diversity and Inclusion 
(ODI).  The ODI’s mission includes the responsibilities identified in section 342 for the 
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion, as well as Equal Employment Opportunity 
compliance and programs addressing diversity and inclusion.  But the United States is not 
alone in trying to solve this inequality problem.  France, at the beginning of 2011, adopted 
quotas requiring that women hold twenty percent of board positions by 2014, and forty 
percent by 2017.  James Kanter, Europe to Study Quotas for Women on Boards, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 4, 2012, at B3.  Other EU countries have similar rules as well with legally binding 
quotas to place women in top business positions.  In Italy, for example, it is required that 
one-third of a corporation’s board be women by 2015 or the business will face severe fines 
that can reach up to €1 million, in addition to the nullification of board elections.  Id.  The 
Netherlands and Spain adopted legal recommendations to increase women’s representation 
on boards, but no actual sanctions for laggards, and similar legislation to that adopted in 
France is under way in Belgium.  Id.  Following these countries’ efforts and reports that 
self-regulation to improve the European Union’s record on placing women in top 
management has failed, the European Union also considered mandating certain quotas for 
women in boardrooms.  Id.  It appears that such a reform might be needed, as pursuant to a 
report done by the European Union, as of January 2012, only 3.2% of the presidents and 
chairmen of large corporations in the European union were women, and women occupied 
only 13.7% of the seats on the boards of large corporations. See Press Release, Europa, 
Women in Decision-Making (Mar. 9, 2012) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRele 
asesAction.do?reference=ETW/12/0309 
&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (calling for public consultation 
to identify measures for increasing the proportion of women in senior positions). 
 184.  While ninety-seven percent of boards in America have at least one woman on their 
board of directors, women still make up only sixteen percent of the total number of 
directors, and the average number of women on boards is two.  See The Korn/Ferry Market 
Cap 100: Board Leadership at America’s Most Valuable Public Companies, THE 
KORN/FERRY INSTITUTE 31 (2010), available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/sites 
/all/files//documents/briefings-magazine-download/The%20Korn_Ferry%20Market%20Cap 
%20100-%20Board%20leadership%20at%20America%E2%80%99s%20most%20valuable 
%20public%20companies%20_0.pdf (compiling the top U.S. public companies by market 
capitalization).  Even worse, “in 2003, women of color accounted for only 3% of the total 
available board seats at Fortune 500 companies.”  Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the 
Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated 
with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2005). 
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management in the post-crisis era.  Statistically speaking, women perceive 
risk differently than men, and react accordingly.
185
  Female investors 
emphasize risk factors considerably more than their male colleagues, and 
have a tendency to focus on decreasing risk more than their male peers.
186
  
These gender differences were proven to be even more significant in 
studies that focused on financial assets and portfolios at risk extremes.
187
  
Moreover, with regard to possessing socially responsible market behavior, 
studies revealed that socially responsible investors are more likely to be 
female and tend to be well-educated.
188
  These factors, therefore, should be 
taken under consideration when setting criteria for risk committees’ 
compositions. 
b) Maximizing Social Outcomes Alongside Profits 
Risk management in financial institutions requires making decisions 
regarding desired levels of risk-taking and profit-maximization.  Following 
the financial crisis of 2008, risk-related decision-makers in financial 
institutions were criticized for not fully integrating social facets into their 
economic models, as society as a whole was asked to bail out financial 
institutions.
189
  Financial institutions, including JPMorgan, have received 
more special benefits from the government than any other large 
corporations and, thus, these entities owe an increased responsibility to 
society.
190
  Indeed, large financial institutions greatly profited from public 
subsidies, which distorted the financial institutions’ economic incentives 
 
 185.  John E. Grable & So-hyun Joo, A Cross-Disciplinary Examination of Financial 
Risk Tolerance, 46 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 151, 155 (2000) (finding that gender was the only 
important explanatory demographic variable of risk tolerance). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See Russell Sparkes, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: A GLOBAL REVOLUTION 
(2002) (discussing the ethics of investing); Barry N. Rosen et al., Social Issues and Socially 
Responsible Investment Behavior: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation, 25 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 221, 229 (1991) (noting that socially responsible investors tend to be younger and 
better educated).  
 189.   See Joel Achenbach, A Sense of Resentment Amid the ‘For Sale’ Signs, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2008 (discussing the reaction to the bailout of one town, 
which is replete with home foreclosures); Jonathan Weber, The Wall Street Bailout:  What 
About Main Street?, NEWWEST.NET, Sept. 23, 2008 (addressing concerns about the 
“unfairness inherent in the rescue plan”), http://www.newwest.net/topic/article/what_does_ 
the_wall_st_bailout_mean_for_you/C35/L35/. 
 190.  See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 41, at 962–63 (arguing that corporations “are state 
creations, and no state in its right mind would willfully allow for the creation of institutions 
as powerful as corporations unless there was a belief that, on balance, society would be 
better off because of their existence”). 
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and further pushed them toward excessive risk-taking.
191
  As a result, 
regulators mandated that risk committee members of financial institutions 
would not make financial decisions that would expose their institutions—
and, more importantly, the economy—to excessive risks.
192
 
Financial institutions’ duties and responsibilities to society should not 
end with a mere attempt to avoid excessive risk taking.  Indeed, in the last 
several decades, global corporate conduct manifested heightened levels of 
responsibility with regard to society.  For example, many corporations 
contributed to a wide range of social causes and needs, beyond merely 
satisfying shareholder obligations or customer demands.
193
  Similarly, 
reinforcing corporate social responsibility in financial investments has 
gained unprecedented momentum and is now embedded in many 
corporations’ codes of conduct.
194
  Indeed, President Obama said in his 
inauguration speech that now is the “Age of Responsibility.”
195
  Similarly, 
many commentators have argued not only that investors should develop 
social responsibility, but also that financial institutions should hone their 
 
 191.   See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address 
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 713 (2010) (discussing the federal 
government’s assurances that it would provide necessary capital infusions to banks before 
regulators’ stress tests). 
 192.   As mentioned, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that SIFIs prepare reorganization and 
liquidation plans, and submit them for review by the regulators.  These living wills also 
mandate that each SIFI internally manage and better monitor its financial risks, and report 
periodically on its credit exposure to other SIFIs, and on the other SIFIs’ exposure to it, in 
order to avoid exposing the financial system to excessive risks.  See generally Packin, supra 
note 16 (analyzing the operation of living wills and their shortcomings). 
 193.  See generally LOUIS DETHOMASIS & NEAL ST. ANTHONY, DOING RIGHT IN A 
SHRINKING WORLD:  HOW CORPORATE AMERICA CAN BALANCE ETHICS AND PROFIT IN A 
CHANGING ECONOMY (2006) (discussing corporate ethics as a realistic tool for increasing 
profit); DONALD F. KETTL, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION (2d ed. 2005) 
(discussing basic models of governmental reform worldwide); SRIYAN DE SILVA & E.F.G. 
AMERASINGHE, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
(2004) (analyzing both the practical and theoretical aspects of corporate social 
responsibility). 
 194.  See WILLIAM B. WERTHER, JR. & DAVID CHANDLER, STRATEGIC CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: STAKEHOLDERS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 63–83 (2006) (addressing 
implementation of corporate social responsibility in a firm’s strategy and culture).  
Similarly, today corporate social responsibility oversight by stakeholders advocating for 
corporate social conduct can also be found.  See Forest L. Reinhardt et al., Corporate Social 
Responsibility Through an Economic Lens, 2 REVIEW OF ENVITL. ECON. & POLICY 219 
(2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13989 (“Business leaders, government 
officials, and academics are focusing more and more attention on the concept of ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ (CSR).”). 
 195.  See Roger Cohen, The Age of Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/opinion/22cohen.html (discussing the inauguration 
speech on January 21, 2009, in which the President called for a new spirit of responsibility 
that serves the greater goals of society). 
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interest to align financial profit maximization tactics with social 
concerns.
196
 
Despite the awareness of the need to consider social responsibility 
when making financial investment and risk-related decisions, studies have 
shown that individuals with varied backgrounds differently prioritize 
factors such as profit maximization and social responsibility when making 
financial decisions.  In an experiment done by Professor Rubinstein in 
2005, 764 students of philosophy, business administration, mathematics, 
law, and economics, were asked to make financial determinations regarding 
the management of a hypothetical company.
197
  More specifically, the 
students were told that calculations indicated that company layoffs would 
help increase their hypothetical company’s profits, and accordingly asked 
to decide exactly how many employees to fire.  They were offered the 
following options:  (i) fire ninety-six employees and gain up to $2,000,000 
annually; (ii) fire fifty-two employees and gain $1,600,000 annually; (ii) 
fire twenty-six employees and gain $1,000,000 annually; or (iv) fire zero 
employees and keep a profit of $400,000 annually.  The economics 
students, more than any other group, chose to fully maximize the profits of 
their company at the expense of the company’s employees, and forty-six 
percent of these students chose to do just that without any consideration of 
the employees.
198
  In fact, they chose to do so despite the fact that the 
layoffs of the last forty-four employees led to a rise of only $400,000 in 
profit.  In stark contrast, only thirteen percent of the philosophy students 
and sixteen percent of the mathematics students chose to maximize the 
profits at all cost, while twenty-seven percent of the law students and 
thirty-three percent of the business students decided to maximize the profits 
in the same way.
199
 
 
 196.  Scholars have also challenged Milton Friedman’s proclamation of profit 
maximization as the key purpose for business activities.  See, e.g., Andrew Crane et al., 
Stakeholder as Citizens? Rethinking Rights, Participation, and Democracy, 53 J BUS. 
ETHICS 107 (2004) (analyzing the impact of corporate citizenship on ethical business 
arrangements); C.K. Prahalad & Allen Hammond, Serving the World’s Poor, Profitably, 80 
HARV. BUS. REV. 4 (Sept. 2002) (examining the ability of multinational corporations to 
stimulate development in developing regions); Puaschunder, supra note 38 (arguing that 
after the 2008 Financial Crisis, the time was ripe for the idea of Socially Responsible 
Investment); JANE NELSON, LEADERSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND PARTNERSHIP: CRITICAL 
TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T 
CORP. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE (2004) (reporting that corporate social 
responsibility has implications beyond the entity itself and into the national and international 
spheres). 
 197.  Ariel Rubinstein, A Sceptic’s Comment On The Study Of Economics, 116 ECON. J. 
C1 (2006). 
 198.  Id. at C3. 
 199.  Id. 
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While Rubinstein’s study results do not show that economics students 
necessarily were wrong, they do show that they were the most extreme, and 
the difference was significant.  The different perspectives and priorities 
thus suggest that forcing diversity in the backgrounds and education of 
boards, and specifically in risk committees, can help counterbalance 
tendencies to make profit maximization the absolute and only relevant goal 
of financial institutions.  Accordingly, in order to increase the likelihood 
that financial institutions’ risk committees will also factor in social 
concerns when planning business strategies, it should be required that risk 
committees will include members from a variety of disciplines.  If 
corporations follow such an approach, risk committees would even 
consider some of the Corporate Social Responsibility movement’s 
concerns. 
2. “The Only Source of Knowledge is Experience”—Albert 
Einstein 
Experience is a valuable qualification.  Committed practice, followed 
by constructive feedback, followed by more committed practice, is believed 
to be a recipe for success.
200
  In fact, an idea that has become very popular 
over the past few years is that it takes approximately 10,000 hours of 
deliberate practice to learn a subject area or skill well enough to actually 
master it.
201
 
While it is obvious that great achievements are possible without 
 
 200.  Corie L. Rosen & Hillary Burgess, More Than Merely Doing:  Deliberate Practice, 
Feedback, and Academic Success,(The Learning Curve), 2010, at 2 (arguing that experience 
is “the only way to truly become expert at anything”). 
 201.  The idea dates back to work done in the 1970s by Herb Simon, who studied human 
problem solving and was interested in the role of knowledge in expertise.  Simon believed 
that to become an expert required about ten years of experience and estimated that expertise 
was the result of learning roughly 50,000 chunks of information.  Cf. WILLIAM G. CHASE & 
HERBERT A. SIMON, PERCEPTION IN CHESS (1971) (demonstrating through perception and 
memory tasks that a chess player’s ability to extract information from a brief exposure to 
positions on a chess board varies with the player’s overall playing strength).  This notion has 
been much further developed in the decades since, mainly by Anders Ericsson, who studied 
the cognitive structure of expert performance, and how experts obtain their superior skills by 
extended deliberate practice.  See generally TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE: 
PROSPECTS AND LIMITS (K. Anders Ericsson & Jacqui Smith eds., 1991).  This practice 
makes perfect sense given the idea has recently been even further developed.  See MALCOLM 
GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS (2008) (arguing that more attention needs to 
be paid to successful people’s upbringing, rather than what they are like); GEOFFREY 
COLVIN, TALENT IS OVERRATED: WHAT REALLY SEPARATES WORLD-CLASS PERFORMERS 
FROM EVERYBODY ELSE (2008) (arguing that innate ability is much less important than is 
traditionally thought).  There are, of course, many provisos to the 10,000 hour rule, such as, 
the person practicing must constantly strive to get better. 
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putting in 10,000 hours of deliberate practice and that it would be a mistake 
to require 10,000 hours of practice as some kind of a proficiency 
requirement, experience is extremely important for professionals.  
Following up on this rationale, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, risk 
committees must employ at least one risk management expert that has 
experience in managing risk at large, complex financial institutions.
202
  
Good judgment, however, almost always comes from experience, and 
experience usually comes from using bad judgment in past experiences. 
Studies have revealed a substantial difference regarding risk attitudes 
between risk managers and non-risk business managers.
203
  The risk 
attitudes of all managers were very similar in judgments related to profit, 
but in potential loss-oriented situations the risk managers were 
considerably more risk-averse than the non-risk business managers.
204
  
Experienced risk managers were much more cautious in their decisions 
than were non-risk managers.
205
 
Relevantly, the risk committee of JPMorgan’s board consisted of three 
directors with no significant banking or risk management experience during 
when the bank was hit by a trading loss of several billion dollars.
206
  
Following the publication of this fact, JPMorgan announced that it would 
make changes to its risk-policy committee,
207
 which is responsible for 
“oversight of the CEO’s and senior management’s responsibilities to assess 
and manage the firm’s credit risk, market rate risk, interest rate risk, 
investment risk, liquidity risk and reputational risk.”
208
 
Accordingly, appointing one experienced member to a risk committee, 
like the Dodd-Frank Act requires, may not be enough to make a difference 
in the committee’s work and decision-making patterns.  When dealing with 
highly sensitive and crucial decisions-making processes regarding potential 
 
 202.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h)(3) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5364) (“A risk 
committee required by this subsection shall. . . include at least 1 risk management expert 
having experience in identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures of large, complex 
firms.”). 
 203.  Gordon C.A. Dickson, A Comparison of Attitudes Towards Risk Among Business 
Managers, 54 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCH. 157 (1981) (discussing a study of differences in 
attitudes between risk managers and non-risk managers). 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  JPMorgan board to shake up risk committee: WSJ, REUTERS (May 25, 2012, 8:31 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/26/us-jpmorgan-board-idUSBRE84P0132012 
0526. 
 207.  Pursuant to reports, the bank is expected to add either Timothy Flynn or James Bell 
to the committee, as they both have backgrounds in risk and finance.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 
96. 
 208.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 96 (quoting the bank’s regulatory filings) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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risks of financial institutions, it should be required that at least a substantial 
percentage of those serving as risk managers or as committee members 
have relevant experience. 
3. Independent Directors on the Risk Committee 
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a separate risk committee, in which 
there will be at least a couple of independent directors, must be established 
to analyze risks that a financial institution is facing.
209
  However, creating 
such a separate risk committee without independent members might not be 
enough to ensure that the committee, as a collective body, will consider, 
with sufficient caution, all the relevant factors related risk tolerance and 
appetite, direction of risk exposure, methods of risk evaluation, emerging 
risks, and exposure of unconventional planning scenarios.  Adding 
independent directors to boards, in order to improve effective monitoring is 
a traditional method used in American corporate law, which can be useful 
in enhancing monitoring.
210
  Monitoring by independent directors primarily 
functions as a substitute for external regulation, because both the judiciary 
and legislative branches are cautious about becoming too involved in the 
business decisions of corporate management.
211
  But this monitoring 
function of the independent directors, in addition to their other duties, can 
also be viewed as a different aspect of an information-forcing-substance 
disclosure model that can help achieve improved corporate governance 
generally and, in this Article’s context, more specifically, better risk-related 
 
 209.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h).  The § 165(h) requirement differs from one suggested in 
an earlier Senate bill that would have mandated that all listed public companies’ boards, 
with certain exceptions, establish a separate risk committee made up of independent 
directors. 
 210.  For general background on independent directors in the United States, see Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (discussing the 
dramatic increase in the presence of independent directors on boards of large public 
companies, from approximately twenty percent independent in 1950 to seventy-five percent 
independent in 2005); see also Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent 
Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 84 (2007) (“A major theme in corporate governance 
writing is the need for non-management directors on the board to serve as a check on 
management in the interests of shareholders.  In other words, non-management directors are 
there to help shareholders solve the agency problem.  If such directors are to monitor 
management effectively, they must be independent of management.  From this contemplated 
role stems the typical definition of ‘independent director’:  one who has no need or 
inclination to stay in the good graces of management, and who will be able to speak out, 
inside and outside the boardroom, in the face of management’s misdeeds in order to protect 
the interests of shareholders.”). 
 211.  Clarke, supra note 210. 
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decision-making processes.
212
 
In the case of risk committees, it appears that it will be effective to 
appoint as members of risk committees several independent directors, who 
will function almost like public interest directors
213
—a concept that 
surfaced during the corporate social responsibility era
214
—as long as the 
independent directors are truly independent.
215
  Functioning like public 
interest directors, such independent directors would represent the interests 
of the communities in which the financial institution, which they serve, 
conducts its main operations.
216
  Following the 2008 financial crisis, this is 
especially important in the context of significant financial institutions, and 
the larger the financial institution, the more applicable this is.  After all, 
one of the Dodd-Frank Act’s main goals is to solve the “too-big-to-fail” 
problem,
217
 a goal that has become a global priority in the last few years
218
 
 
 212.  Gordon, supra note 210, at 1563. 
 213.  Compare NORTON E. LONG, The Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local 
Community, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 202 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960) 
(discussing public interest directors who will represent the communities in which the large 
corporation conducts business), with Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the “Modern” 
Corporation: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 50–53 (1966) (analysis 
of double-tiered boards in Germany).  William O. Douglas argued for the use of 
professionals that would be hired on a full time basis as public interest directors.  WILLIAM 
O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 52–53 (1940). 
 214.  The idea behind this was that federal law “would require major corporations to 
name to their boards a certain number (say, three) of directors from among a cadre of 
experienced public interest directors.  When critics pointed out that managers, and perhaps 
fellow board members, would treat such directors as spies and antagonists, denying them 
access to information and use of other corporate resources, reformers tacked onto such 
proposals the requirement that corporations provide staff exclusively to serve the public 
interest directors.”  See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1213 (2002) (discussing proposals for public interest directors).  Public 
interest director proposals received support from Arthur Goldberg, who argued that the 
inability of independent directors, let alone public interest directors, to obtain the support 
required makes it problematic for them to properly perform their jobs.  “Independent 
directors needed plenary access to corporate information, professional assistance, and other 
legally mandated aids in order to accomplish what was expected of them.”  Id. 
 215.  Many corporate scholars share the opinion that existing definitions of 
independence may be too relaxed.  See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, 
Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 845–46 (2007) (assessing the Disney 
decision which dealt with executive compensation); Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of 
Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1175 (2011) (assessing potential 
reasons why independent directors have not been more effective in improving corporate 
governance). 
 216.  LONG, supra note 213. 
 217.  “Too-big-to-fail” was first termed in 1984, concerning the federal bank’s 
intervention to prevent Continental Illinois National Bank from failing.  See DAVID S. 
HOLLAND, WHEN REGULATION WAS TOO SUCCESSFUL—THE SIXTH DECADE OF DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE TROUBLES OF THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE 1980S AND 
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because many felt that society should not and could not afford the costs 
associated with the “too-big-to-fail status quo.”
219
  Indeed, during the recent 
financial crisis, in order to maintain the stability of the economy, the U.S. 
government provided subsidies to the bigger financial institutions totaling 
approximately $1.525 trillion through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
220
 
and the Stimulus Package.
221
  These programs, which were criticized for 
having used taxpayers’ money to save Wall Street,
222
 were accompanied by 
 
EARLY 1990S 37–51 (1998) (discussing policy options during Continental Illinois National 
Bank’s resolution).  The term has received great attention in the last two decades.  See, e.g., 
Benton E. Gup, Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Too Big to Fail?, in POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 287, 310 (Benton E. Gup ed. 2003) (“GSE direct and 
guaranteed debt is 40 percent larger than the federal government’s debt.”); Helen A. Garten, 
Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 
129, 146 (1986) (noting the “widely held perception that some banks are too big to fail”); 
Jeffrey E. Garten, Op-Ed., Too Big to Fail: Megamergers Could Create Economic Havoc, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A27 (discussing that American citizens and corporations are 
“so intertwined with major financial firms around the world that they will never be allowed 
to fail”).  During the recent financial crisis, regulators announced that the government would 
provide capital to the top nineteen biggest bank holding companies if, based on the results of 
“stress tests,” they needed it but could not raise it on their own.  Consequently, the 
government ended up injecting more than $220 billion of capital into eighteen of those 
conglomerates, and by doing so indicated that all nineteen firms were presumptively “too-
big-to-fail at the time.”  See Wilmarth, supra note 191, at 713 (discussing rationales behind 
federal government’s monetary supports for financial firms). 
 218.  See, e.g., Ann Graham, Bringing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The Case 
for Ending “Too Big To Fail”, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117 (2010) (discussing effective resolution 
mechanisms to address “too big to fail”). 
 219.   See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout 
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 991 (1992) (“The first justification for the presumption against 
bailout is that government intervention to protect private industry violates the free-market 
principles that generally govern our economy.”); Gary H. Stern, Address to the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (May 6, 2009) available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/sterntestimony05-06-09.pdf (statement of, 
President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis addressing the “too-big-to 
fail” problem); see also Gary H. Stern, Address at Winona State University (Nov. 13, 2008), 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news_events/pres/stern11-13-08.cfm (“Once 
immediate fires have been doused, policymakers will have to turn to reining in TBTF 
because, left unchecked, the TBTF embers remaining from our emergency response will 
likely contribute to future financial conflagrations.”). 
 220.   See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008)).  The Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act was established as a response to the subprime mortgage crisis and helped establish the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, which enabled the Treasury to purchase or guarantee up to 
$700 billion in troubled assets that were owned by financial institutions.  Id. 
 221.   See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2009) as an economic stimulus program). 
 222.   See Weber, supra note 189 (discussing solutions other than Wall Street bailouts).  
Indeed, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program argued that a 
total of $23.7 trillion in taxpayer money could be expended through various programs that 
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bailouts for the “too-big-to-fail financial institutions.”
223
  Thus, having 
several independent directors on financial institutions’ risk committees that 
will better represent Main Street
224
 might help balance the interests of the 
financial institutions with those of society. 
 
were meant to re-stabilize the U.S. financial system and help the economy.  OFFICE OF THE 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, ADVANCING 
ECONOMIC STABILITY THROUGH TRANSPARENCY, COORDINATED OVERSIGHT AND ROBUST 
ENFORCEMENT (July 21, 2009) available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly 
%20Reports/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 223.   The U.S. Department of the Treasury website provides details on programs 
designed to supply continued capital to financial institutions and to conduct stress tests of 
the biggest, most systemically important financial institutions to make sure they are capable 
of surviving the financial crisis.  Financial Stability, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 
2013); see also KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE 
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 181–214 (2009) (detailing the fall of Bear Stearns); Press 
Release, FDIC, FDIC Closes Sale of Indymac Federal Bank, Pasadena, California (Mar. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09042.html (sale of 
Indymac Federal Bank); Failed Bank Information, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/indiv 
idual/failed/IndyMac.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (detailing failed bank information); 
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (Sept. 7, 
2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx 
(detailing the federal bailout of housing agencies); Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets:  
Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial Regulators, Hearing before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (April 3, 2008), available at http://banking. 
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=ec013d8f-fe1e-4f 
b6-a514-ab93be32ad38 (hearings on financial regulations); Matthew Karnitschnig, U.S. to 
Take Over AIG in $85B Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (AIG bailout); Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence 
on Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at A1 (discussing how the federal government urged 
Bank of America to remain silent on the troubled Merrill Lynch deal); David Enrich & 
Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bailout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, 
at B1 (Citi Bailout); Feds Give Green Light to Wells Fargo-Wachovia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
(Oct. 10, 2008, 3:02 PM), available at http://www.newser.com/story/39663/feds-give-
green-light-to-wells-fargo-wachovia.html (Wells-Fargo bailout). 
 224.  Main Street has been described as “real places doing real work to revitalize their 
economies and preserve their character.”  See Nat’l Trust for Historic Preservation, About 
Main Street, http://www.preservationnation.org/main-street/about-main-street/ (discussing 
the main street movement).  Pursuant to media in the United States, “Main Street,” 
represents the interests of everyday working-class people that are often contrasted with 
“Wall Street,” which symbolizes the interests of corporate capitalism.  See, e.g., Richard 
Kirsch, Occupy Is Right: It’s the Economy, Stupid. And Don’t Forget Democracy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-
kirsch/occupy-wall-street-campaign-finance_b_1471150.html (discussing the “Occupy Wall 
Street” movements view of economic inequality); John Tozzi, Investing in Main Street 
Instead of Just Wall Street, BUS. WK., Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles 
/2012-04-25/investing-in-main-street-instead-of-just-wall-street (discussing the support of 
local businesses). 
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Commentators encourage such semi-public interest directors to act as 
“naysayer” independent directors and to occasionally function as a devil’s 
advocate, rejecting various risk committee proposals.
225
  Indeed, studies 
show that considering arguments against a course of action by asking 
probing questions, challenging basic assumptions, focusing on 
counterfactuals, or suggesting other scenarios and possibilities can reduce 
both overconfidence and excessive risk-taking among corporate 
executives.
226
  Considering alternatives is efficient; by emphasizing 
opposing arguments and suggesting what could go wrong, decision-makers 
see risks as more relevant and recognize other possible options, thereby 
 
 225.  See COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 174–75 
(2004) (discussing the appointment of a “designated critic” who will dissent and help ensure 
that management is challenged); BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT? HOW TO USE 
EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 9 (2003) (discussing why 
boards should identify a devil’s advocate to challenge suggested proposals); Paredes, supra 
note 174 (discussing the advantages of appointing “naysayers” on board committees); 
Harold J. Ruvoldt, Jr., A way to get to “what if . . .?”, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 2003, at 
31 (discussing the possibility of developing “black papers” to present the worst-case 
scenario); cf. Diane L. Coutu, Putting Leaders on the Couch: A Conversation with Manfred 
F.R. Kets de Vries, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 65, 70 (2004) (quoting de Vries’ argument that 
every leader could use the help of “people with a healthy disrespect for the boss—people 
who feel free to express emotions and opinions openly, who can engage in active give-and-
take”); David Gray, Wanted: Chief Ignorance Officer, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 22 (2003) 
(arguing that ignorance can spawn new ideas). 
 226.  Paredes, supra note 174 at 740 (“Studies show that explicitly considering the 
opposite—that is, considering arguments against a course of action, such as by asking 
probing questions and follow-ups, challenging key assumptions, focusing on 
counterfactuals, or developing other options—can reduce overconfidence.”).  See generally, 
Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
422, 440 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1982) (reviewing methods to reduce overconfidence 
and hindsight and noting that these biases tend to “resist attempts . . . to eliminate them”); 
Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 110 
PSYCH. BULL. 486 (1991) (discussing the “consider-the-opposite” as a technique of tackling 
biases); Hal R. Arkes et al., Two Methods of Reducing Overconfidence, 39 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 133, 143 (1987) (noting that when 
people were informed how poorly they were performing on answering basic questions, those 
people faced remaining questions “with significantly lower confidence”); Stephen J. Hoch, 
Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Personal Events, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 719, 729 (1985) (arguing that 
counterfactual reasoning can improve predictive accuracy in those “with a predisposition to 
attribute good outcomes to internal factors”); Charles G. Lord et al.,, Considering the 
Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 
1231 (1984) (showing that considering the opposite can help improve judgment); Charles R. 
Schwenk & Richard A. Cosier, Effects of the Expert, Devil’s Advocate, and Dialectical 
Inquiry Methods on Prediction Performance, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
PERFORMANCE 409, 422 (1980) (comparing three decision-making techniques and 
advocating for the use of a devil’s advocate in organizational decision making). 
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introducing doubt.
227
  Such doubt could both decrease executives’ 
overconfidence and encourage the board to veto or to rethink and 
reorganize potentially harmful projects that might otherwise be approved 
based on the executives’ initial, less thought out endorsement.
228
 
In order for this “naysayer” independent director concept to succeed, 
individuals filling this role must be independent professionals and well-
regarded in their fields.
229
  In addition, such individuals must have access to 
all the information needed for them to fulfill their duties to effectively press 
the other board members and the executives and ask probing questions and 
present viable alternative business strategies.
230  
Finally, the “naysayers” 
cannot be a source of agency problems for the financial institution and 
must really investigate the relevant courses of actions and suggested views 
before making different suggestions and presenting opposing views.
231
 
Independent directors, however, should not take themselves too 
seriously and be too disruptive or grind things to a halt.
232
  After all, their 
effect should not be to block desired courses of action.  Similarly, they 
should not replace most of the management directors on the risk 
committee.
233
  Some argue that appointing a wholly independent committee 
does not ensure better risk management.
234
  To the contrary, it is important 
for the risk committee members to know each other and feel comfortable 
 
 227.  See, e.g., David Trafimow & Janet A. Sniezek, Perceived Expertise and Its Effects 
on Confidence, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 290, 300 (1994) 
(showing that general perceived expertise affects confidence on discrete decisions); Hal R. 
Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 305, 305–06 (1988) 
(“[C]onsidering the opposite [outcome] was effective in reducing overconfidence.”); cf S. 
Plous, A Comparison of Strategies for Reducing Interval Overconfidence in Group 
Judgments, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 443 (1995) (finding that “overconfidence persisted in the 
face of explicit warnings, instructions to expand interval widths, and extended group 
discussion” and that “using the devil’s advocacy approach” did not yield better performance 
than “individuals working alone”). 
 228.  But see Plous, supra note 227. 
 229.  Paredes, supra note 174 at 745 (“[I]ndividuals filling the devil’s advocate role 
should have stature and should be well-regarded so that their views are respected and 
heeded . . . .”). 
 230.  Paredes, supra note 174 at 745. 
 231.  See Paredes, supra note 174, at 745–46 (arguing that appointed naysayers cannot 
“[s]imply [go] through the motions” of playing devil’s advocate, as they could give “officers 
and directors ‘cover’ if they make a bad decision”). 
 232.  Paredes, supra note 174, at 746. 
 233.  See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 265 (2002) 
(concluding that having insiders on the board can and does add value); Sanjai Bhagat & 
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 922 (1999) (“[Firms with] majority-independent boards 
appear not to perform any better than firms without such boards.”). 
 234.  See, e.g., The Uncertain Relationship, supra note 233, at 922. 
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with each other.  Trust among the team is critical for actual insider 
members to share their knowledge of areas of exposure, rather than not 
knowing what is happening, or trying to prove that they are not aware of 
any weaknesses.
235
  The independent directors should be included in the 
committee as an additional effective monitoring tool, especially as studies 
have shown that increasing the number of directors does not undercut 
performance.
236
 
In addition, based on behavioral finance studies, the risk committee, as 
a group, will most likely be exposed to the choice shift phenomenon—a 
documented effect according to which groups make riskier decisions than 
individuals in finance and investment-related issues.
237
  Indeed, groups 
have been shown to significantly prefer high-risk investments.
238
  Research 
has shown that the inclusion of outsiders, such as independent directors, 
might help counterbalance this choice shift.
239
  Thus, it is crucial to recruit 
independent directors who have different backgrounds, experiences, and 
educations from those of the risk committee members.
240
  This will increase 
the likelihood that the independent directors will have a different agenda 
than the other directors and individuals who serve on the risk committee, 
and help counterbalance the impact of the choice shift phenomenon.
241
 
 
 235.  See Stuart, supra note 63 (discussing best practices for corporate risk 
management). 
 236.  See Mohamed Belkhir, Board of Directors’ Size and Performance in the Banking 
Industry, 5 INT’L J. OF MANAGERIAL FIN. 201 (2009) (finding that “there is robust evidence 
that larger boards achieve a higher performance”). 
 237.  See M. King Deets & George C. Hoyt, Variance Preferences and Variance Shifts 
in Group Investment Decisions, 5 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE, 378, 
378–79 (1970) (noting that individuals in groups “change their preferences in the direction 
of assuming greater risk”). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  See, e.g., Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. 
FIN. ECON. 138, 139 (2009) (studying the effect of social ties on seemingly-independent 
boards). 
 240.   “[E]ven one isolated director can provide a degree of protection to minority 
shareholders by publicizing, or threatening to publicize, majority shareholder abuses of 
which he becomes aware.”  Clarke, supra note 210, at 80. 
 241.   Some commentators argue, however, that independent directors may not have this 
effect on the board’s decision-making processes.  See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for 
the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010) (arguing that independent directors are 
overvalued at the expense of inside directors); Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO 
Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 935, 936 (2003) (exploring the impact of having board members who also serve as 
board members for another corporation on CEO compensation and turnover); Idalene F. 
Kesner et al., Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of 
Fortune 500 Companies, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 789, 794–96 (1986) (examining the impact of 
various board structures on corporate misconduct).  This criticism may be a reflection on the 
vague definition of “independence,” and cognitive biases limit directors’ ability to act or 
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B. Risk Committees’ Obligations 
1. Disclosure Requirements 
Individuals are often torn between the desire to gain from being 
dishonest and the desire to maintain a positive self-concept as honest 
individuals.
242
  If individuals cheat, they could, in many cases, gain 
financially at the expense of an honest self-concept.
243
  Attempting to solve 
this motivational dilemma, individuals typically find a balance between the 
two motivating forces, such that they derive some financial benefit from 
their dishonesty, but at the same time are still able to maintain their positive 
self-concept.
244
  Trying to understand what factors impact such balance, 
behavioral economics studies have researched what causes individuals 
to act in a more honest fashion.
245
  Accordingly, it has been shown that 
causing individuals to become more aware of their standards for honesty 
actually decreases the individual’s tendency for deception.
246
 
Utilizing the results of these studies to enhance risk management 
regulation, risk committee members should be required to make frequent 
periodic statements to their financial institution’s board and executives, 
confirming that to the best of their knowledge, their institution complies 
with all risk management-related legal requirements.  The risk committee 
members should also confirm that as far as they know, no overly excessive 
risks are being taken by the financial institution.  Requiring risk committee 
members to do this would make them more aware of their internal sense of 
integrity, which might have a positive effect on their performance.  
Accordingly, if submitting such statements will entail admitting that the 
financial institution is not legally compliant or that excessive risks are 
being taken, reports should be submitted detailing the lack of compliance, 
the nature of such risks, and the precautionary measures adopted by the risk 
committee regarding those risks. 
While adopting such disclosure requirements is burdensome, 
disclosure mandates still play a key role in risk management provisions 
because they target the mistakes and misperceptions at the core of 
 
make decisions in a manner consistent with a theoretical perception of independence. 
 242.  Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept 
Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008). 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 643 (“In this work, we suggest that people typically solve this motivational 
dilemma adaptively by finding a balance . . . between the two motivating forces, such that 
they derive some financial benefit from behaving dishonestly but still maintain their positive 
self-concept in terms of being honest individuals.”). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
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behavioral market failures.
247
  Moreover, such disclosure requirements 
appear necessary in light of recent events, such as the MF Global collapse, 
which underscores the downside of a senior risk officer reporting to the 
CEO without having a formal pipeline to the board.
248
  Following the MF 
Global case, signing off on regulatory disclosures has become more 
important than ever.
249
  Similarly, it is now also clear that more and better 
disclosure could have prevented, or at least minimized, the large losses 
suffered by JPMorgan in 2012.
250
  Accordingly, commentators have argued 
that, at the very least, risk committee members should report either jointly 
or solely to the board,
251
 and report beyond the board directly to regulators, 
if further action appears necessary.
252
 
However, any strict rules regarding mandatory disclosure, especially 
 
 247.  See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and 
the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1230–32 (2003) 
(discussing the effects of regulation on consumers); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003) 
(encouraging rules that will “improv[e] the welfare of the people affected by them.”). 
 248.   Prior to filing for bankruptcy, MF Global was already seen as having taken on an 
enormous amount of risk with little room for error given its size.  According to media 
articles, the risk management activities at the financial firm were handled in a responsible 
and positive manner under the guidance of CRO Michael Roseman.  See Katherine Heires, 
MF Global Fallout:  Good or Bad News for CROs?, GARP.ORG (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.garp.org/risk-news-and-resources/2012/february/mf-global-fallout-good-or-bad-
news-for-cros.aspx (subscription required).  After working at MF Global from 2008 until 
early 2011, Roseman reportedly left because his warnings about the amounts of the 
excessive liquidity risks went unheeded.  “He did everything he was supposed to do,” one 
commentator argued.  Id.  “He identified the risk, he reported it to the CEO, and the board 
was well aware of the matter.”  Id.  Based on the reports, Roseman had expressed concerns 
to Corzine—to whom he reported—and to the board of directors about a $6.3 billion bet on 
European sovereign debt and the resulting liquidity risk associated with that bet. 
 249.  Id. (“Veteran capital markets observer Larry Tabb, founder and CEO of 
Westborough, Massachusetts-based Tabb Research” argued that given the MF Global 
fallout, “he would not be surprised to see risk managers over time signing off on regulatory 
disclosures and, in light of recent events, being asked to report beyond the board, directly to 
regulators.”).  
 250.  It has been reported that some top JPMorgan “executives and directors were alerted 
to risky practices by a team of London-based traders two years before that group’s botched 
bets cost the bank more than $2 billion . . . Interviews with more than a dozen current and 
former members of the bank’s Chief Investment Office, the unit responsible for the losses, 
indicate that discussions about reining in London traders started as early as 2010.  Certain 
directors were briefed then on a foreign-exchange-options bet that went bad.” Dan 
Fitzpatrick, Gregory Zuckerman, & Joann S. Lublin, J.P. Morgan Knew of Risks, WALL ST. 
J., June 12, 2012, at A1. 
 251.  See Heires, supra note 248 (citing capital markets observer Larry Tabb’s 
recommendation “that risk managers at trading firms report either jointly or exclusively to 
the board”). 
 252.  See Heires, supra note 248 (noting that the board and CEO of MF Global 
disregarded CRO Michael Roseman’s concerns about excessive liquidity risk). 
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to regulators, should be carefully considered and tailored, as disclosure 
might not always have a positive impact.  Requiring an overly detailed or a 
premature disclosure to regulators in the financial markets, even if aimed at 
greater investor protection and enhanced market efficiency, can be 
damaging.
253
  Such disclosures can interfere with financial institutions’ 
competitive capacities and weaken the system of private incentives for 
innovation.
254
  When information of competitive value is also of value 
within financial markets, not disclosing it would negatively impact a 
financial institution’s ability to raise finance and make resource allocation 
less effective.
255
 
2. The Illusion of Control 
Even when an event is uncontrollable, individuals often still believe 
that they have some ability to control the outcomes.
256
  This illusion of 
control, which is well documented in behavioral finance literature, makes 
individuals believe that based on their skills and expertise they can 
influence the result of a random situation and avoid large monetary 
losses.
257
  This bias was recently demonstrated by the MF Global collapse.  
 
 253.  See generally Sergio Gilotta, The Conflict between Disclosure in Securities 
Markets and the Firm’s Need for Confidentiality:  Theoretical Framework and Regulatory 
Analysis 2 (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/s 
ol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1709334 (discussing the pros and cons of disclosure and noting 
that it can be “extremely harmful for the firm”). 
 254.   Id.  
 255.   Id.  
 256. See H. Kent Baker & John R. Nofsinger, Psychological Biases of Investors, 11 FIN. 
SERVS. REV. 97, 103 (2002) (noting that “[p]eople often believe that they have influence 
over the outcome of uncontrollable events”); Ellen Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 311, 312 (1975) (citing evidence that people treat chance 
events as controllable). 
 257. See, e.g., JAMES MONTIER, BEHAVIOURAL INVESTING: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 20–22 (2007) (presenting one study where professional 
investors were shown to be less likely to correctly predict stock outcomes than both 
laypeople and coin flips); Ellen Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 311 (1975) (stating that unlike skill-based activities, success in forecasting 
chance-based events is uncontrollable); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion 
and Well-being: a Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
193, 196 n.2 (1988) (stating that unrealistically positive self-views are the result of “private 
posturing,” not public conditioning); Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Portfolio Choice and 
Risk Attitudes: An Experiment (Feb. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7vz7w609#page-2 (varying levels of control, 
ambiguity, and freedom of choice did not ultimately change individual tendencies to engage 
in risky investment behavior).  For an example of how the illusion of control is documented 
in behavioral finance literature, see Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future 
Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). 
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Due to the worsening Eurozone crisis, the firm was facing a great sovereign 
risk, and it was unclear if it could get by the potential related loss.
258
  But 
MF Global has other problems as well.  The firm needed to take a $119 
million accounting charge, a write-off of tax credits accumulated from 
years of operating losses.
259
  In meetings with the CEO, several worried 
risk managers spelled out the fears, but the CEO did not think the firm 
needed to make any drastic changes.
260
  MF Global’s CEO said that he 
would personally explain to the credit firms and the investors how and why 
everything would be alright, as it was all a matter of needing a little more 
time before he and his deputies would work it all out.
261
 
Thus, in order to reduce the amount of excessive risk to which risk 
committees expose their financial firms while operating under the 
impression that the situation is under control, it is crucial for committee 
members to remain aware of the inherent inability to control a situation.  
The best way to do so is to expect the worst.
262
  This means that risk 
committee members should undergo short training sessions to learn about 
this bias, along with techniques to best counterbalance it.  Additional focus 
should be given to case studies demonstrating that despite the ability and 
skill of financial institutions’ executives, boards, and risk committee 
members, not all situations can be controlled.  Thus, executive, board, and 
risk committee members should be required to analyze and advance-
prepare potential responses to all possible scenarios.  One of the key 
lessons from the 2008 financial crisis was that financial institutions should 
always be prepared for all possible outcomes—“the sad truth we have 
learned is that this is absolutely necessary.”
263
 
C. Risk Committees’ Working Procedures and Functioning 
1. A Formula Is Worth Less Than A Thousand Words 
Another behavioral trait demonstrated by Professor Rubinstein’s 
studies relates to the “framing effect” regarding the format through which 
 
 258.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5. 
 259.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5. 
 260.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5. 
 261.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5 (“It was a belief,” says one of the dismayed 
executives, “in an ability to get through any situation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 262.  See Packin, supra note 16, at 253 (“The need to be prepared for all possible 
scenarios . . . is one of the lessons from the recent financial crisis.”). 
 263.   See Huw Jones, FSA Says Clashes Over Bank Living Wills Inevitable, FORBES, 
Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.lse.co.uk/ShareNews.asp?shareprice=HSBA&Article 
Code=xfl0n1hg7m3df9r&ArticleHeadline=FSA_says_clashes_over_bank_living_wills_inev
itable (quoting Hector Sants, FSA Chief Executive). 
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information is presented to decision-makers.  Commentators within the 
behavioral decision-making field widely acknowledge that the research of 
effect closely relates to people’s judgment-based decision-making.
264
  
Researching this issue, Rubinstein tested individuals on the issues of profit-
maximization versus social responsibility, and gave the test subjects 
questionnaires in both mathematical function and verbal description form.  
The results were much more radical when the dilemma was described as a 
function:  Approximately seventy-five percent of the test subjects decided 
to fire the maximum number of employees.
265
  It appears that numbers 
blinded test subjects from the fact that they were responsible for issues 
beyond profit maximization, such as supporting the economy of the 
hypothetical company’s town, and helping individuals from that 
community keep their jobs.  A main conclusion from that experiment, inter 
alia, was that presenting financial and business situations in a purely 
mathematical format eliminates their complexity.
266
 
Scholars have also found that minor adjustments in the wording of 
judgments can have a major effect on choice behavior in relation to risk,
267
 
and slight differences in how risks are presented can significantly affect 
how they are perceived.
268
  People tend to make moral judgments through 
moral heuristics, which may be less sound than moral judgments that 
derive from deliberative reasoning.
269
  As a result, framing effects can be 
used to change individuals’ perceptions of risk.  For example, according to 
studies that investigated the connections between framing problems, risk 
perception, and risk-taking behavior: (1) positively-framed situations are 
perceived as higher-risk than their negatively-framed counterparts; and (2) 
the degree to which test subjects make risky decisions is negatively 
associated with their degree of risk perception.
270
 
Reconciling these studies’ conclusions is difficult.  On the one hand, 
 
 264.  See generally HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 548 (Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. 
Haviland-Jones & Lisa Feldman Barrett eds., 3d ed. 2008) (“[E]ven mild and even positive 
affect can markedly influence everyday thought [and decision-making] processes, and does 
so regularly”); HANDBOOK OF AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION (Joseph P. Forgas ed. 2001); 
ANDREW ORTONY, GERALD L. CLORE & ALLAN COLLINS, THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF 
EMOTIONS (1988); KENNETH T. STRONGMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION (3d ed. 1987).  
 265.  Rubinstein, supra note 197.  Seventy-three to seventy-seven percent of subjects in 
all groups chose the profit-maximizing solution of 100, which was also the maximum for X.  
 266.  Rubinstein, supra note 197. 
 267.  Fischhoff, supra note 226, at 483. 
 268.  Fischhoff, supra note 226, at 483. 
 269.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 423 n.17 (2009). 
 270.  Sim B. Sitkin & Laurie Weingart, Determinants of Risky Decision-Making 
Behavior: A Test of the Mediating Role of Risk Perceptions and Propensity, 38 ACADEMY OF 
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1573–92 (1995). 
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any attempt to describe information in a verbal, neutral, complete, and 
accurate way to risk committee members is doomed to fail.  As explained, 
an underlying assumption of cognitive psychology holds there is no such 
thing as “neutral” framing, though framing can be more or less 
inflammatory.  On the other hand, significant business- and risk-related 
dilemmas should clearly not be presented only in mathematical formulas, 
because numbers alone can be deceptively misleading.  Thus, analyses of 
the qualitative side of business- and risk-related dilemmas are also needed 
to make intelligent and well-balanced decisions.  Commentators agree that 
it is imperative to have common-sense insights into various business and 
financial aspects, the individuals involved in those aspects, and any 
important, additional, multi-layered issues.
271
  Thus, ideally, risk 
committees should be presented not just with highly sophisticated and 
carefully devised mathematical formulas and models, but also qualitative 
information that should be framed in the least inflammatory fashion.
272
 
 
 271.  Dean Simone, a partner and United States risk assurance leader at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, has said that one:  
cannot approach any analysis purely from a quantitative perspective.  The 
numbers only tell you one story and the numbers could be misleading.  You 
need to have the qualitative side to that too and you need to marry that with 
common sense insofar as your knowledge of the business, its people and 
whether there is some issue that is percolating that you want to get ahead of.  
You will not find an internal audit group or compliance function that is effective 
if it only looks at one of those data points or doesn’t consider the qualitative 
things you need to think about that are outside the numbers . . . . [B]anks are 
realizing that risk management cannot solely be a data-driven exercise.  Risk 
management may have started as a discipline with a dearth of data, which 
forced it to be more empirical in its identification of risk factors.  But with 
access to massive amounts of data, risk managers have perhaps become too 
dependent on using data and models without looking at the numbers and asking: 
so what does this all mean? 
Rachel Wolcott, Beyond the Numbers: Do Banks Manage Risk?, REUTERS BLOG (June 14, 
2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/06/14/beyond-
the-numbers-do-banks-manage-risk/ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 272.  Statistical and mathematical formulas and models are central to the assessment and 
prediction of both human and organizational behavior.  Nevertheless, the importance of 
qualitative information is also obvious.  Accordingly, a clinical versus statistical prediction 
debate has been the focus of applied psychology researchers for many decades now.  
Despite the great amount of research done, it appears that Paul E. Meehl’s analyses of this 
issue, which was mostly published in the 1950’s and 1960’s, has not been significantly 
improved upon since then.  Meehl’s conclusion was that statistical prediction, which 
includes, inter alia, information combined by formulas, computer programs, and actuarial 
tables, outperforms clinical judgment.  See generally Paul E. Meehl, Causes and Effects of 
My Disturbing Little Book, 50 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 370 (1986).  However, while 
admitting “that [a decision-maker] cannot act in accordance with both of [two] incompatible 
predictions,” Meehl, nevertheless, promoted using clinical judgment in many instances, 
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Accordingly, various examples of potential financial, business, and 
social consequences from all spectrums of the scales should be provided 
and presented to risk committee members, based on different potential 
business scenarios.  This will increase the chances that other factors in 
addition to profit maximization will be taken under consideration, such as 
social aspects or potential catastrophic outcomes, with as few “framing 
effects” consequences as possible. 
2. “Accountability Breeds Response-Ability” – Stephen R. 
Covey 
Decision Theory literature suggests that a sense of accountability 
contributes to better decision-making.
273
  Similarly, accountability is likely 
to improve performance in both judgment- and decision-making tasks.
274
  
Given the psychological impact that accountability has on performance, 
this effect should be utilized in order to counter-balance any biases toward 
 
arguing that “[n]obody has ever disputed that the actuary would be well advised to listen to 
clinicians in setting up the set of variables.”  Id. at 372 (1986).  Moreover, Meehl had 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of factoring in predictions clinicians’ important 
insights, arguing that it would be erroneous to adopt an assertion that “the clinician is a 
second-rate substitute for a Hollerith machine,” a mechanical tabulator that can rapidly 
tabulate statistics from millions of pieces of data.  PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS 
STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 76 
(1954) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, Meehl argued that there is “a ‘special 
power of the clinician’ that cannot, in principle, be completely duplicated by even the most 
sophisticated computer program.”  William M Grove & Martin Lloyd, Meehl’s Contribution 
to Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193 (2006) 
(discussing the major contributions of Meehl’s work).  Promoting this notion, Meehl has 
become known for analyzing the inherent limitations of actuarial prediction.  Using his 
famous “broken-leg cases” to explore this issue, he asserted that “there are too many 
distinct, unanticipated factors” influencing human behavior, and that researchers cannot 
gather good actuarial data on all of those factors so that models can take them into account.  
Id. at 192–94.  
 273.  See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping With 
Accountability: Conformity, Complexity and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOLOGY 632 (1989) (revealing that individuals unconstrained by prior commitments 
will be incentivized and inclined to do more complex, self-critical thinking when made 
accountable to individuals with unknown views); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, 
Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 700 (1987) (discussing how research results reveal that 
accountability caused subjects to digest and process data in more sophisticated and 
meaningful ways). 
 274.  See Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to 
Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 416 (1992) 
(stating that research reveals that accountability can impact the way people think as well as 
their thoughts and can cause decision-makers to make less judgment and choice errors). 
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risk taking that exist among risk committee members.  Accountability can 
impact behavior in two ways.  First, it can help individuals to avoid putting 
imprudent risk-related choices into practice, merely by creating fewer 
opportunities to misbehave.  Second, it can improve the decision-maker’s 
judgment.
275
 
Nevertheless, it should be made clear that in return for appropriate 
compensation, such professionals must be held fully accountable for 
overseeing the risk in a transparent and public fashion.  This could be 
accomplished by annually publishing the names of risk committees’ 
members in different financial publications, so as to increase their sense of 
accountability and, therefore, responsibility.
276
  Doing so would only be 
taking an extra step beyond a recent SEC recommendation.
277
  The SEC has 
suggested rules mandating that corporations disclose more information on 
their board leadership structure, including information on whether the 
corporation has a lead director, and if so, what his or her role is in guiding 
it.
278
  The SEC also recommended including information on the 
qualifications of board members, any potential conflicts of interest that 
might impact compensation consultants, and how the relevant corporation’s 
compensation guidelines are aligned with risk-taking.
279
 
  
 
 275.  In order for risk committees to make quick judgments about the risky 
characteristics of the investments they oversee, individuals with sufficient stature relative to 
the line executives they oversee should be appointed as committee members.  Such 
individuals could be motivated in exchange for proper compensation.  While this might 
seem trivial, this was not the case at JPMorgan, where senior chief risk officer Barry 
Zubrow earned less than his peers at global banks and was not among his company’s top tier 
in compensation.  Zubrow has been the head of the Corporate and Regulatory Affairs of 
JPMorgan since January 2012.  Before then, Zubrow had been Chief Risk Officer since 
November 2007.  See People: JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM), REUTERS (10/12/2012), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyOfficers?symbol=JP 
M&WTmodLOC=C4-Officers-5 (showing Zubrow’s compensation as not in the top tier, 
and otherwise unlisted) (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
 276.  This is already done internally, to a great extent, in financial institutions, and 
sometimes such internal publications find their way into the public media.  See, e.g., J.P. 
Morgan Makes More Risk Management Changes, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 1, 2012, 11:04 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/06/01/j-p-morgan-makes-more-risk-management-cha 
nges/ (noting JPMorgan’s 2012 announcement regarding nominations and changes in the 
risk management departments). 
 277.  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Measures to Improve 
Corporate Governance and Enhance Investor Confidence (July 1, 2009) http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2009/2009-147.htm. 
 278.  Press Release, Sec. & Exc. Comm’n, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About 
Risk, Compensation and Corporate Governance, (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/new 
s/press/2009/2009-268.htm. 
 279.  Id. 
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3. Detailing Potential Ruinous Consequences of Considered 
Risks 
Studies demonstrate that individuals’ views of risk are greatly 
impacted by whether or not they associate the risk with potentially 
disastrous outcomes.
280
  A majority of managers that were presented with 
several investment options, which included either one safe choice or one 
uncertain choice, were risk-seekers when faced with below-target 
outcomes, and seventy-one percent of the managers displayed general risk-
seeking behaviors.  When faced with an uncertain choice that had potential 
actual ruinous losses, sixty-four percent of the managers tested showed 
clear risk-averse tendencies.
281
 
Life outside the hothouse, unlike in experiments conducted with very 
clear terms and specific options, is often more grey than black and white.  
Even if an uncertain option can end up with ruinous consequences, such an 
outcome often appears to be very unlikely.  Indeed, this was the situation at 
MF Global.  Only months before the firm realized it had to file for 
bankruptcy,
282
 a detailed disaster scenario was prepared at the board’s 
request, which was a written fire drill in expectation of a “run on the bank” 
after a firm’s credit downgrade to junk status.
283
 This disaster scenario 
report came to be known as the “break the glass” plan, and despite the 
already known great risks, its summary passage concluded that MF Global 
would surely survive.
284
  
But even without being overly optimistic about risks, can 
sophisticated financial institutions’ risk management, which include 
scenario planning,
285
 interactive simulation, and war games,
286
 always be 
 
 280.  Dan J. Laughhunn et al., Managerial Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 
26 MGMT. SCI., 26, 1238–49 (1980). 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  See, e.g., Jonathan Spicer & Nick Brown, Corzine’s MF Global collapses under 
euro zone bets, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2011, 7:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10 
/31/us-mfglobal-idUSTRE79R4YY20111031 (discussing the types of risky assets that led to 
MF’s downfall). 
 283.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5 (concluding that “remain solvent—are able to 
manage liquidity through stress period as we reposition our business and stabilize our 
financing lines”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 284.  Elkind & Burke, supra note 5. 
 285.  Scenario analysis attempts to answer the same questions as the VAR, but only from 
a more qualitative perspective—namely, what are the possible outcomes a financial 
institution faces and what is the likelihood of each outcome actually happening:   
Scenario analysis is an important tool in decision making.  It has been in 
existence for several decades and has been used in various disciplines, including 
management, engineering, defense, medicine, finance and economics. . . . It is a 
tool that, when properly and systematically used, can bring to light many 
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able to predict the threat of potential ruinous losses, and warn about the 
dangers?  No.  For example, using only symmetric distribution assumptions 
will not prevent possible losses from occurring with greater probability, 
which is commonly referred to as the “fat tail” issue.
287
  Similarly, the 
occurrence of a “tail dependence,” which is the risk that a loss in one 
sphere will cause losses in other spheres, is always a possibility, despite the 
fact that an initial loss can be at the tail of the probability distribution.
288
  
And such tail dependence risk is not the only radical scenario of which 
financial institutions’ risk management systems must be wary.  Destructive 
and disastrous events can occur in a random way that cannot be modeled or 
calculated in advance.
289
  Indeed, according to Professor Nassim Taleb, 
disastrous events are “black swans”—always new and unthinkable.
290
  
 
important aspects of a situation that would otherwise be missed.  Scenario 
analysis tries to navigate the possible situations and events that can impact an 
entity in the future, with respect to the characteristics we are trying to measure 
and given the state of the entity at the present time. 
Kabir K. Dutta & David F. Babbel, Scenario Analysis in the Measurement of Operational 
Risk Capital: A Change of Measure Approach, (July 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565805. 
 286.  A war game is a special simulation of combat.  Corporations adopted this exercise 
and use it as a business improvement technique—a simulation of competition in a 
marketplace.  This tool has become popular, as it offers strategists new ways to analyze their 
businesses, their competitors, and their business decisions.  The main purpose of most war 
games is to increase companies’ profitability and success in the face of competition and a 
series of uncontrollable trends and occurrences.  See generally, Benjamin Gilad, BUSINESS 
WAR GAMES:  HOW LARGE, SMALL, AND NEW COMPANIES CAN VASTLY IMPROVE THEIR 
STRATEGIES AND OUTMANEUVER THE COMPETITION (2009); MARK L. HERMAN ET AL., 
WARGAMING FOR LEADERS: STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE 
BOARDROOM (2009). 
 287.  See, e.g., Barry J. Eichengreen, Ten Questions About the Subprime Crisis, 11 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 19, 21 (2008) (stating that “[e]ven state-of-the-art models have a tendency 
of underestimating the probability of extreme outcomes”); see also Susan Pulliam et al., 
Merrill Upped Ante as Boom in Mortgage Bonds Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at A1 
(discussing Merrill Lynch’s aggressive posture in the MBS market before the 2008 crisis). 
 288.  See Fanto, supra note 61, at 742 (suggesting that financial modeling may be flawed 
because it fails to take into account the possibility of spillover effects and noting that 
catastrophic financial events do not necessarily occur in isolated sectors—they may cause 
unexpected problems in other areas, problems that the models in those sectors fail to 
account for); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND 
STRESS TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 9 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ 
/bcbs147.pdf (stating in the context of the 2008 crisis:  “Most risk management models, 
including stress tests, use historical statistical relationships to assess risk.  They assume that 
risk is driven by a known and constant statistical process . . . The turmoil has revealed 
serious flaws with relying solely on such an approach.”). 
 289.  Nassim Nicholas Taleb, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 274–85 (2007). 
 290.  Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to 
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Preparing in advance to deal with black swans or trying to prevent black 
swans from happening entails a logical problem.  Even if proper risk 
management measures were put in place in advance to prevent black swans 
and were indeed successful in doing so—preventing a new and unthinkable 
specific event from ever happening—no one would know that the newly 
installed measures were the cause of the success, as the unthinkable event 
never happened.
291
  Nevertheless, when the same newly installed measures 
are not successful in preventing a second, different, also new and 
unthinkable event from happening, the public will be enraged, arguing that 
wasteful unsuccessful risk management procedures were installed, which 
failed to detect and prevent an unthinkable [second] event from happening.  
And since it is impossible to predict every single new and unthinkable 
event and prevent it in advance, this outcome is inevitable.  Moreover, in 
the process of trying to amend the risk management measures after existing 
measures failed to detect an unthinkable event from happening, damaging 
changes can be made, which will prevent the potential ability to predict and 
prepare for a different kind of event.
292
 
Therefore, while it should be understood that any attempt to create a 
bulletproof protection against ruinous losses is doomed to fail, risk 
committees can increase their members’ awareness of any potential 
consequences.  By doing so, risk committee members will be able to make 
decisions that are less likely to result in ruinous losses as such 
consequences will be considered in advance.  Accordingly, all the options 
from which committee members must choose should be carefully outlined 
to them, and emphasis, as well as explanations in great detail, should be 
given regarding the more uncertain options, especially if they have possible 
disastrous consequences.  After all, based on studies done, if the risk 
committee members will understand the full scale of potential ruinous 
losses, they will show more risk-averse tendencies in their decision-
 
Evaluate Wall Street Trades Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 27–31, available 
at 2009 WLNR 152510. 
 291.  “If risks are well prevented, we’ll never know how much value was preserved 
because we will never experience the loss.  All we will have to measure is the cost of 
prevention. . . . It is a problem because while we can identify the value of a ‘no’ decision in 
theory, in the real world ‘no’ decisions will be evaluated routinely only in hindsight.  In 
hindsight, they tend to not look very good unless we are already facing a disaster.”  
Okamoto supra note 72, at 217. 
 292.   “[I]f financial-market complexities produce new situations of risk that may have 
little to do with model outcomes, risk assessment and measurement may aggravate the 
situations because they change the conduct of parties who believe that they have already 
prepared for the worst.”  Fanto, supra note 61, at 752–53; see also GEORGE COOPER, THE 
ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT 
MARKET FALLACY 144–48 (2008). 
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making. 
4. This Time, It’s Different 
The theme of familiarity bias plays a significant role within the risk 
perception literature.  Research indicates that people tend to “see a little of 
the past in many present situations and base their decision on what they 
believe to be the implications of these past events.”
293
  Accordingly, in the 
risk context, people feel more comfortable with risk-taking when they are 
familiar with the specific relevant risks.  For example, it has been proven 
that investors tend to put too much faith in familiar stocks, as they view 
investing in them as safer than investing in unknown stocks and even safer 
than investing in diversified portfolios.
294
 
In order to avoid entering into excessive risks when decision-makers 
feel familiar and comfortable with known but nevertheless dangerous risks, 
which may appear less dangerous than they really are, analyses of the 
unknown factors associated with the pending risks should be done.  The 
analyses need to reflect all aspects of the potentially excessive risks, and 
show that even if the circumstances this time around are safer based on and 
in comparison to past results, taking these risks is the desired course of 
action for the financial institution. 
5. Fighting The Hindsight Bias 
People’s inclination to fixate on what is available causes the hindsight 
bias, one of the most researched shortcomings in human beings’ probability 
evaluations.
295
 People find it easier to imagine events “that actually took 
place” rather than events “that did not,” which results in overestimating of 
the likelihood of events that actually did take place.
296
  The hindsight bias, 
therefore, explains this “tendency of actors to overestimate the ex ante 
prediction that they had concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurring 
after learning that it actually did occur.”
297
  Research demonstrates that 
 
 293.  Thomas Gilovich, Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to 
Familiar Events on Judgments and Decisions, 40 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 
798 (1981). 
 294.  H. Kent Baker & John R. Nofsinger, Psychological Biases of Investors, 11 FIN. 
SERVS. REV. 97, 101 (2002). 
 295.  See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 
1095–1100 (2000) (discussing hindsight bias). 
 296.  Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 165, at 10. 
 297.  Thomas S. Ulen, Human Fallibility and the Forms of Law: The Case of Traffic 
Safety, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 397, 410 (Francesco Parisi & 
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hindsight bias plays a role in individuals’ risk probabilities calculations.
298
 
Accordingly, the need to counterbalance the hindsight bias and, as 
mentioned above, prepare for all possible scenarios, has placed the issue of 
stress testing—a specific procedure of risk-management
299
—in the 
spotlight.  Stress tests are designed to discover weak points in financial 
institutions’ systems at an early stage, and to assist the financial 
institutions, and the regulators supervising them with deciding what 
preventive actions must be taken.  Stress tests are a procedure for 
evaluating the potential loss of a portfolio due to shocks to its underlying 
risk factors over a wide range of scenarios, however unlikely the 
probability of the occurrence may be.
300
  Therefore, stress tests are 
essentially forward-looking economic assessments that check whether 
financial institutions are strong enough to endure pessimistic economic 
conditions or extreme emergencies.
301
  The Dodd-Frank Act requires 
financial regulatory authorities to conduct annual analyses of systemically 
important financial institutions as part of the Act’s enhanced supervision 
provisions.  Pursuant to this requirement, the authorities will evaluate 
whether the financial institutions “have the capital, on a total consolidated 
basis, necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic 
conditions.”
302
  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act requires all systemically 
important financial institutions to conduct internal semi-annual stress tests, 
and mandates that all other regulated financial companies with assets equal 
to or greater than ten billion dollars conduct internal annual stress tests, and 
report the results of the testing to the authorities.
303
  A summary of such 
reports will also get published by the SIFIs and the other tested financial 
 
Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). 
 298.  Rapp, supra note 57, at 159.  Supplementing the effect of hindsight bias is the 
“denominator blindness” effect, which was analyzed by Kip Viscusi and Richard 
Zeckhauser.  According to their study, individuals are likely to focus only on the “number of 
adverse outcomes” when calculating the “risk” of an event taking place, instead of focusing 
on the more correct “number of adverse outcomes” divided by the number of possible 
adverse outcomes, which is explained as the “exposure” to adverse outcomes.  W. Kip 
Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Denominator Blindness Effect:  Accident Frequencies 
and the Misjudgment of Recklessness, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72, 74–75 (2004). 
 299.   See Fanto, supra note 61, at 736 (discussing the evolution of risk management 
regulatory requirements). 
 300.   Jared Pedowitz, Market Risk Management Walkthrough Template 6 (2007), 
available at http://jenner.com/lehman/docs/ERNST%20&%20YOUNG/EY-LE-LBHI-KEY 
PERS%201015089-1015103.pdf. 
 301.   See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 288, at 9–11 
(discussing stress testing methodologies). 
 302.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i)(1)(A). 
 303.  Id. § 165(i)(2). 
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companies.
304
 
Financial institutions should, therefore, be encouraged to internally 
require that all of their risky major business decisions be made based on 
stress tests’ results relating to these type of risks, and that prior to entering 
into any series of risky transactions the specific transactions be tested and 
general stress tests be administered.
305
  Financial institutions’ risk 
committees should focus on improving their existing stress testing abilities.  
Thus, in addition to using the traditional risk-management techniques, risk 
committees should also use reverse stress testing—stress tests that start 
from the assumption of business failure and then identify the circumstances 
where this result might take place.
306
  Therefore, unlike in regular stress 
tests, which test for outcomes resulting from changes in circumstances, 
reverse stress tests require a different kind of an analysis—understanding 
the circumstances that would make financial institutions’ business model 
not feasible—a process that helps SIFIs identify possible weaknesses.
307
 
Risk committee members should work on developing scenarios that 
cover as many different situations as possible.  The tests developed must 
include examining the worst-case scenarios and testing the financial 
institutions’ businesses under different burdening, implausible conditions 
to prepare for all possible scenarios.  Additionally, war games, coupled 
with broader use of simulated stress tests, could be a great tool to help 
financial institutions analyze how they should act, given that all the 
financial institutions are operating in one system and interacting with each 
other.
308
  Similarly, vigorous stress tests conducted on the international 
level will help identify the weakest links of the global financial system. 
Consequently, financial institutions should allocate resources to focus on 
global crisis planning and develop better global financial war-gaming 
testing abilities.  Simulation and war games are essentially other methods 
to obtain information about the potential weaknesses of financial systems, 
but they greatly differ from traditional, conventional quantity oriented 
models by enabling a number of participants to interact with a 
 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Packin, supra note 16. 
 306.  See Reverse Stress Testing, FIN. SERVS. AUTHORITY (last updated Apr. 24, 2010), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/stress_testing/firm_s/reverse_stress_
testing/index.shtml (explaining reverse stress testing). 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  War games used together with international regulations pose a much more efficient 
way to plan for potential unimaginable economic crises.  The use of war games and multi-
participant simulations can provide guidance on the risks that financial institutions face from 
the remainder of the highly interconnected international banking system.  See Packin, supra 
note 16. 
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mathematical model.
309
  Indeed, simulation games can help obtain more 
meaningful results by including in the mathematical models more complex 
aspects of real human behavior.  Mathematical algorithms cannot yet 
simulate human behavior as well as humans can. 
Thus, wise use of scenario planning tools, such as simulation games, 
can help risk committees better deal with the hindsight bias and its effect 
on financial institutions’ risk managers’ performance.  Moreover, using 
simulation games as part of scenario planning will also enable risk 
committees to use the services of other professionals, such as psychologists 
to assist them to create more scenarios to analyze, and to prepare for,
310
 and 
refrain from being negatively affected by the hindsight bias. 
CONCLUSION 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, it is more evident than ever that 
the regulation of procedures and policies used by financial institutions to 
identify, monitor, and mitigate risks is extremely important to the financial 
markets and the economy, and should thus be carefully created. 
Attempting to address this issue, the Dodd-Frank Act requires specific 
large financial institutions to create separate risk management committees, 
and includes a few basic composition requirements for these committees.  
The Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements, however, are very basic and do not 
reflect the regulators’ legitimate concerns regarding excessive risk-taking 
and its potential dire consequences.  Additional regulation is necessary to 
regulate the way decision makers make risk-related decisions, and fight the 
deeply rooted biases and cultural-institutional attitudes toward excessive 
risk-taking.  As demonstrated above, behavioral economics studies reveal 
certain biases and behavioral patterns, which might negatively impact risk 
committees’ work dynamics, analyses processes and decision-making 
procedures.  Being aware of these human tendencies and properly 
addressing them by “debiasing” the relevant actors through the structure of 
legal rules, can reduce such tendencies’ dangerous or negative influences in 
the context of risk taking, and improve risk management oversight. 
Accordingly, this Article argues that the Federal Reserve should adopt 
rules that include behavioral economics-based guidelines regarding risk 
committees’ composition, obligation requirements, and working 
procedures.  Alternatively, the Dodd-Frank Act should be amended to do 
 
 309.  G. ORCUTT ET AL., MICROANALYSIS OF SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEMS: A SIMULATION 
STUDY 3-281 (1961) (including simulations of activity of the nation’s economy). 
 310.   René M. Stultz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They 
Happen? 20 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 39, 47–48 (2008). 
PACKIN - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  1:05 PM 
482 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
so.  Requiring risk committees to follow such guidelines will only increase 
the effectiveness of the risk committees’ work.  And in order to make sure 
that financial institutions do comply with such guidelines, failure to do so 
should be viewed as a violation that must be enforced under the securities 
laws.  Indeed, despite the fact that traditionally risk management was an 
internal affairs issue, following the 2008 crisis many agree that some 
federal regulatory oversight on the matter is needed, which is what resulted 
in federal requirements such as mandating that financial institutions prepare 
living wills.  Moreover, federal regulation of risk management is important 
because the threat of systemic risk during the 2008 crisis only became 
relevant following losses that resulted from risk management failures at 
major financial institutions. 
This Article’s suggested guidelines regarding risk management are 
also not subject to the criticisms that have been made of behavioral law and 
economics.  Indeed, while it does base certain policy recommendations on 
behavioral economics studies, these suggestions do not attempt to predict 
behavior, but to help direct individuals’ and groups’ decision making 
processes in the right direction.  This includes, inter alia, having risk 
committees consider multiple factors when making decisions, being 
presented with full information prior to finalizing financial decisions, 
improving group compositions, and causing group decisions to be less 
affected by the groups’ individual members’ backgrounds.  And while 
these suggestions do apply to financial institutions’ corporate governance, 
the corporate governance structure remains flexible enough to 
accommodate different personalities, while still being able to address 
management overconfidence, by installing various methods to 
counterbalance such a bias without imposing a single regulatory response. 
 
 
